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This first paper examines Virginia Woolf’s understanding of the relationship 
between self and other as expressed in Jacob’s Room and Mrs. Dalloway. Because Woolf 
only indirectly articulates her ideas regarding the interconnections between individuals, 
this paper juxtaposes Woolf with the Russian literary theorist Mikhail Bakhtin to better 
illustrate her ideas, as her conceptualizations prove antithetical to Bakhtin’s. While 
Bakhtin maintains that individuals do not exist as solitary monads, but only in dialogic 
relation to each other, Woolf intimates otherwise. Asserting that individuals remain 
incomprehensible to one another, stressing the solitary nature of individual experience, 
and emphasizing the narratives people generate which complicate the ways in which they 
engage others, Woolf suggests that individuals remain fundamentally estranged from one 
another. In short, Woolf sees only an isolating incommunicability of consciousness 
between individuals. Ultimately, Woolf’s understanding of the relation between self and 
other is predicated on her view that selves possess an inviolable, elusive core which 
exists prior to the self’s social instantiation.  
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This second paper explores the ways in which Great Expectations challenges 
Mikhail Bakhtin’s understanding of the relationship between individuals, emphasizing 
that Bakhtin ultimately overlooks the power struggles characterizing their interactions. 
Whereas Bakhtin privileges dialogical discourse over monological, assuming that 
individuals engage one another largely in good faith, Great Expectations reveals a world 
within which individuals aggressively superimpose their own perspectives over others. In 
particular, as Great Expectations is Pip’s tale told by Pip himself, so the novel reveals the 
inescapable centrality of Pip’s voice as he is empowered to represent both himself and 
others. This paper argues that Pip, in representing himself in his own story, does not 
dialogue with the other characters in the narrative; rather, he reacts to them, engaging 
them largely in relation to his own singular desires. In short, positing a model of the self 
much less dialogical than agonistic, Great Expectations suggests that selves attempt to 
author themselves not in open dialogical response to others, but through monological 
evasions and negations of them.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                   “[H]ERE WAS ONE ROOM; THERE ANOTHER”: TRACING  
RELATIONS BETWEEN SELF AND OTHER IN  
WOOLF AND BAKHTIN 
AND 
“SO, I CALLED MYSELF PIP”: VOICE, AUTHORITY, AND 
THE MONOLOGICAL SELF IN GREAT EXPECTATIONS 
 
by 
Michael R. Bedsole 
 
A Thesis Submitted to  
the Faculty of The Graduate School at 
The University of North Carolina at Greensboro 
in Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 
Master of Arts 
 
 
 
Greensboro 
2006 
 
 
 
       
       
      Approved by 
    
      _____________________________ 
      Committee Chair 
 
APPROVAL PAGE 
 
 
This thesis has been approved by the following committee of the Faculty of The 
Graduate School at The University of North Carolina at Greensboro.  
 
 
  Committee Chair ______________________________________ 
  
                  Committee Members _______________________________________ 
                                                     _______________________________________ 
                                
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
____________________________ 
Date of Acceptance by Committee 
 
 
 
 ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
“[H]ERE WAS ONE ROOM; THERE ANOTHER”: TRACING 
    RELATIONS BETWEEN SELF AND OTHER IN WOOLF 
    AND BAKHTIN   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
 
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37 
 
“SO, I CALLD MYSELF PIP”: VOICE, AUTHORITY, AND THE 
    MONOLOGICAL SELF IN GREAT EXPECTATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  41 
 
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  76 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iii
“[H]ERE WAS ONE ROOM; THERE ANOTHER”: TRACING RELATIONS 
BETWEEN SELF AND OTHER IN WOOLF AND BAKHTIN       
 
In her “A Dialogical Introduction to Mrs. Clarissa Dalloway,” Debra Williams-
Gualandi suggests that Woolf’s novel may be unproblematically analyzed according to 
Bakhtin’s dialogic model. For Williams-Gualandi, “Bakhtin’s tools of analysis provide a 
way to discuss Woolf’s sensitive portrayal of the way individuals perceive themselves in 
relation to their experience of the world” (279). Moreover, she stresses that Woolf’s work 
illustrates Bakhtin’s understanding of the heteroglossic nature of language and discourse: 
“The dynamic and flexible nature of the novel [Mrs. Dalloway] derives from the sensitive 
novelist’s ability to reflect in discourse the beliefs and structures that exist in society at 
any given time” (279).1 That is, Woolf’s characters’ speech reveals the complex social 
values and relationships permeating those characters’ lives.  
But while Williams-Gualandi may be right that Woolf “implicitly offers the 
reader an investigation into how historical and sociological events and institutions are 
interpreted into language utterances” (279), nevertheless, in order to posit a dialogical 
Woolf, she must suppress much of Bakhtin. For Bakhtin does not limit his 
conceptualization of discourse to an examination of heteroglossic utterances, but expands 
upon this theory to argue how consciousness itself is constituted through responsive 
dialogue with other consciousnesses (Bakhtin, “Discourse” 345). More than simply
                                                 
1 In his discussion of Bakhtin, David Richter succinctly defines heteroglossia as “the notion that the 
meaning of language is socially determined, that utterances reflect social values and depend for their 
meaning on their relation to other utterances” (528). 
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exploring “the seams of the boundaries between utterances” (Bakhtin, Speech 119), 
Bakhtin stresses that “consciousness is in essence multiple” (“Toward” 288), that a 
“person has no internal sovereign territory, he is wholly and always on the boundary” 
with another (“Toward” 287). In contrast, privileging precisely the individual’s “internal 
sovereign territory,” the modernist novelist Woolf posits characters whose 
consciousnesses express a profound singleness, thereby undermining Bakhtin’s notion 
that selves exist exclusively on their boundaries, dialogically responding to others. 
Consequently, Williams-Gualandi’s suggestion that Woolf’s work illuminates Bakhtinian 
dialogism evades key conceptual differences between Woolf and Bakhtin regarding their 
theorizations on the self, for Woolf’s understanding of the self proves incompatible with 
Bakhtin’s. 
Nevertheless, juxtaposing Woolf and Bakhtin does aid in understanding Woolf, 
for as Bakhtin’s conceptualization of the self proves oppositional to Woolf, so it also 
helps clarify Woolf’s own ideas. Of course, while Bakhtin is a theorist, Woolf is not, and 
her intuitions regarding the self and its relation to others emerge only indirectly in her 
fiction and fragmentally in her essays on fiction. But this is precisely why Bakhtin proves 
useful in an analysis of Woolf, for through contrast, ideas more or less implicit in 
Woolf’s writings become explicit. As Bakhtin stresses an exclusively relational 
understanding of human selfhood and experience, arguing that individuals engage one 
another with their entire being, constituting themselves through dialogical exchange, so 
Woolf’s work suggests the opposite, indicating that individuals remain hidden from and 
unknowable to one another, and that to each individual there remains something private 
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which cannot be conveyed. Bakhtin “envisaged all of life as an ongoing, unfinalizable 
dialogue, which takes place at every moment of daily existence” (Morson and Emerson 
59); but where Bakhtin sees dialogue, Woolf sees an isolating incommunicability of 
consciousness. 
By means of a study of Jacob’s Room and Mrs. Dalloway, two texts that express 
Woolf’s thinking, this paper will explore Woolf’s portrayal of the relationship between 
self and other in contradistinction to Bakhtinian theory, arguing that Woolf perceives an 
infinite gulf between individuals that determines the way they interact with one another. 
In short, Woolf’s view that individuals remain unknowable to one another, her emphasis 
on the solitary nature of bodily experience, and her suggestion that individuals generate 
narratives which obstruct dialogue and distort the image of others, imply a model of 
interpersonal relations in which individuals remain fundamentally estranged from one 
another, where no dialogical encounter proves possible. For Woolf, “here was one room; 
there another” (Dalloway 127). Ultimately, Woolf challenges Bakhtin’s conceptualization 
of what a self is, suggesting instead that an inviolable, ungraspable core exists prior to the 
self’s social instantiation, which resists any encounter with another. 
Both Woolf and Bakhtin question the notion of unified consciousness as posited 
in the Western, masculine, Enlightenment tradition, and both writers suggest a more fluid 
conceptualization of the self, though each does so for different reasons. As a Marxist 
critic, Bakhtin formulates dialogism in oppositional response to those traditions which 
presuppose consciousness as a self-unified and stable phenomenon. As Bakhtin sees it, 
any “faith in the self-sufficiency of a single consciousness” is a false faith generated by 
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capitalism’s atomizing (il)logic, as capitalism “create[s] the conditions for a special type 
of inescapably solitary consciousness” (“Toward” 288). For Bakhtin, rather, “the very 
capacity to have consciousness is based on otherness” (Holquist 18). Bakhtin observes, “I 
cannot manage without another, I cannot become myself without another; I must find 
myself in another by finding another in myself” (“Toward” 287). In other words, psyches 
should not be “perceived as ‘things’” or understood as unitary monads (Bakhtin, 
Problems 9), but should be seen as existing entirely in relation to other selves with whom 
they perpetually engage. Fundamentally, Bakhtin maintains that “[t]o be means to 
communicate” with another and that only in “revealing” oneself for another can one 
“become [one]self” (“Toward” 287). And, as selves only exist in relation to other selves, 
and as dialogue between selves is unending, so the self is never in itself finalized. Indeed, 
“[a]s long as a person is alive he lives by the fact that he is not yet finalized, that he has 
not yet uttered his ultimate word” (Bakhtin, Problems 59). Thus Bakhtin suggests that 
selves do not exist in and of themselves, as unified monads; rather, selves exist wholly as 
ongoing “threshold” events on the boundaries of other selves (“Toward” 287).  
Woolf’s writings convey a strong sense of her own conceptualization of the 
relationship between self and other. Woolf sees the self not as a “threshold” event, 
relationally engaged with others, but rather as something deeper, more elusive, and more 
solitary at its root. In “A Letter to a Young Poet,” Woolf ponders, “What does one mean 
by ‘one-self’? . . . It is a self that sits alone in the room at night with the blinds drawn” 
(269). For Woolf, the self manifests itself not in dialogue, but when withdrawn, divided 
apart from others. Such an image is drawn out more dramatically in Mrs. Dalloway, as 
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Clarissa, watching the old lady in the window across from her, muses on her solitude, 
“Let her climb upstairs if she wanted to; let her stop. . . . Somehow one respected that—
that old woman looking out of the window, quite unconscious that she was being 
watched. There was something solemn in it . . . the privacy of the soul” (126). Who the 
old woman is, her interiority as exists for herself alone, remains private, unknowable to 
others, and ultimately incommunicable. For Clarissa, and implicitly for Woolf, the old 
lady embodies the exclusive otherness of the other, an otherness dialogue cannot 
negotiate, and “that’s the mystery” (127). As Bakhtin stresses the unceasing and ever 
unfolding dialogical encounter between selves, so Woolf emphasizes the distance 
between individuals, their inability to participate in such encounters, isolated as they are 
within their own “private universe[s]” of experience (“Letter” 269). In short, against 
Bakhtin, Woolf sees the self as singular, removed from others, a private phenomenon. 
Woolf’s understanding of the self’s alienation from others can be seen in part as 
predicated on Woolf’s understanding of consciousness. Though contra Bakhtin, Woolf 
sees self as essentially singular, as existing in itself and not in relation with another, like 
Bakhtin, Woolf acknowledges that individuals are not unified monads. In A Room of 
One’s Own, contemplating both the mind’s powers of perception and “sexual duality” 
(Childs 167), Woolf writes, “What does one mean by ‘the unity of the mind,’ I pondered, 
for clearly the mind has so great a power of concentrating at any point at any moment 
that it seems to have no single state of being. . . . Clearly the mind is always altering its 
focus, and bringing the world into different perspectives” (96). As the mind’s singularity 
is splintered by the myriad states of consciousness it is capable of experiencing, and as 
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none of these distinctive states expresses the infinite possibilities of the whole, so the 
whole escapes encapsulation by any one state. For Bakhtin, one cannot conceive of the 
self as a self-unified entity because selves exist only relationally. But for Woolf, disunity 
is not a product of individuals’ interrelationships, but remains intrinsic to the self itself, as 
consciousness resists any “single state of being.” But by constantly “altering” themselves, 
“bringing the world into different perspectives,” individuals, Woolf suggests, likewise 
defy any singular instantiation of themselves for others; for internally divided, individuals 
cannot help but be divided from one another.   
Such an understanding of the self is reflected throughout Woolf’s fiction and her 
writing on fiction. In her essay “Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown,” Woolf writes of Mrs. 
Brown: “You should insist that she is an old lady of unlimited capacity and infinite 
variety; capable of appearing in any place; wearing any dress; saying anything and doing 
heaven knows what” (“Mr. Bennett” 212). Woolf suggests here that attempts to represent 
character, to capture another’s “single state of being,” always struggle against the 
irreducible complexity of personality and voice.2 To appropriate Bakhtin’s language, 
Mrs. Brown, as any individual, remains “unfinalizable,” as she always escapes any final 
word on herself. However, whereas Bakhtin maintains that selves resist finalization as 
they engage in unending negotiations across boundaries with others, where selves never 
cease responding to other selves, Woolf maintains that characters resist finalization 
because something about an individual always evades another’s comprehension. In short, 
                                                 
2 According to Porter Abbott, Woolf’s thinking on character is not without contradiction: “On the one hand, 
Woolf sets not only her art but her own sense of personhood against the occluding operations of character; 
on the other hand, she engaged throughout her life in a daily pursuit of character in the pages of her diary” 
(397). In his essay, Abbott attempts to resolve this apparent contradiction. 
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selves elude other selves, resisting embodiment for the other, remaining always 
elsewhere. As Woolf writes in “Modern Fiction,” “Whether we call it life or spirit, truth 
or reality, this, the essential thing, has moved off, or on, and refuses to be contained any 
longer in such ill-fitting vestments as we provide” (287). And of course, what “move[s] 
off” also moves away from others, resisting contact, and trivializing dialogue. 
Consequently, there is no generative encounter on the boundary as Bakhtin affirms, 
during which selves “freely and reciprocally” reveal themselves (Bakhtin, Problems 59). 
For Woolf, in direct contradiction to Bakhtin, the elusiveness of selves implies an 
incommensurability between selves, for as selves resist presence for one another, so they 
convey a solitude negating dialogical exchange. 
Woolf’s project in Jacob’s Room illustrates her concern with how selves thus 
remain essentially unknowable to each other, victims of an insurmountable distance 
spread between them that they cannot bridge. To emphasize just how selves elude one 
another, the novel juxtaposes characters’ reflections on Jacob. For, as the disparities 
between these multiple perceptions of Jacob become apparent, and as it becomes clear 
that Jacob resists others’ attempts to “finalize” him, so one realizes how unknowable and 
foreign individuals truly remain to each other. For example, early in the novel, Clara, 
Julia Eliot, Timothy Durrant, Mr. Sopwith, Betty Flanders, Captain Barfoot all briefly 
express their own separate ideas of Jacob, yet none of them captures or sums up Jacob. 
Clara finds Jacob “so unworldly”; Julia Eliot feels that Jacob, “to get on in the world,” 
needs “to find his tongue”; Mrs. Flanders sees her son’s “clumsiness,” and so on (71). 
Later on, Sandra Wentworth Williams observes that Jacob is like Moliere’s Alceste, a 
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severe, easily deceived, “small boy” (169); Florinda considers Jacob, “like one of those 
statues” in the British Museum (80); and Bonamy feels that the “trouble [with Jacob] was 
this romantic vein in him” and a “stupidity” (140). In the midst of exploring these 
characters’ thoughts on Jacob, the narrator observes: “It seems that a profound, impartial, 
and absolutely just opinion of our fellow-creatures is utterly unknown” (71). Illustrative 
of the elusiveness of all individuals, Jacob remains an always receding ungraspable 
phantom, an “unseizable force” whom others can never know (156).  
Thus, no matter what the text conveys of Jacob, Jacob “escapes categorization” 
(Kiely 210), hovering on the edges, never fully materializing for his companions or the 
reader. As Briggs notes, “Jacob . . . remains mysterious, opaque, as other people always 
are” (93). Though Bakhtin maintains that individuals reveal themselves to the other, 
Jacob does not reveal himself to anyone. And as Bakhtin stresses the interpenetration of 
selves, Woolf suggests only that individuals “Try to penetrate” (93). Indeed, the narrator 
of Jacob’s Room asks: “Can I never know, share, be certain? Am I doomed all my days 
to write letters, send voices, which fall upon the tea-table, fade upon the passage . . . 
while life dwindles?” (93). And though Jacob leaves behind concrete traces of himself 
(letters, the wicker chair, his shoes), these remainders do little more than ironically 
reinforce the distance separating Jacob from others. Avrom Fleishman comments, “there 
is always something left over which marks the self as unique. These residues of identity 
are most clearly observed in the paraphernalia of living, the concrete objects which come 
to represent the traits or interests of the individual who selects and uses them” (52). Yet 
these “residues of identity” are not identity itself, but only so much jetsam doing little to 
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connect individuals with each other. Thus Woolf asserts that one can never know another, 
nor approach the other. So contending, Woolf undercuts one of Bakhtin’s primary 
arguments, that selves dialogically engage the other by “revealing” themselves to the 
other (“Toward” 287). Woolf implies that selves remain concealed, never quite 
substantiating themselves for another, always “mov[ing] off, or on.”  
Reinforcing the claims of Jacob’s Room, Mrs. Dalloway likewise illustrates the 
estrangement between self and other. And in the same way that Jacob’s Room 
demonstrates Jacob’s elusiveness via the juxtaposition of numerous voices commenting 
on him, so too Mrs. Dalloway illustrates Clarissa’s elusiveness. For example, at 
Clarissa’s party Peter Walsh sits discussing Clarissa with Sally Seton, comparing their 
respective impressions of her. Sally notes that “Clarissa was at heart a snob” (190), and 
that “Clarissa was hard on people” (191). But at the same time Sally notes “how generous 
to her friends Clarissa was!” and how “pure-hearted” she was (191). Clarissa escapes 
Sally’s attempts to represent her to Peter, who himself experiences ambivalent feelings 
concerning Clarissa: “But I do not know . . . what I feel” (191). Near the end of this 
scene, Sally also observes that she really knows nothing about Clarissa or Richard, but 
“only jumped to conclusions, as one does, for what can one know even of the people one 
lives with every day?” (192). And even though the novel ends with Clarissa’s dramatic 
reentrance to her party, with Peter Walsh declaratively announcing, “It is Clarissa” (194), 
Clarissa’s presence here only highlights her absence the moment before, as Clarissa had 
been privately contemplating Septimus’ suicide and the secret “thing” Septimus “had 
preserved” by means of his suicide (184). The novel does not suggest the distance 
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between Peter and Clarissa or Sally and Clarissa has lessened in any way as Clarissa 
reenters the room, but rather stresses Clarissa’s ungraspable otherness as neither Peter nor 
Sally can comprehend the private moment she has experienced. As Ruotolo notes, 
“Clarissa will not solidify” (117). Thus, Clarissa’s appearance in the last line of the novel 
ironically underscores Peter and Sally’s inability to grasp her, as the objects Jacob left 
behind had ironically emphasized his own elusiveness.  
Peter and Sally’s unsuccessful attempt to pin down Clarissa recapitulates an effort 
the entire novel has repeatedly illustrated. For others in the text likewise attempt to define 
Clarissa: Kilman, for instance, views her as degenerately wealthy; Lady Burton 
understands her as someone who has impeded her husband’s success (106); and Richard, 
though he loves Clarissa, sees her as rather frivolous. But as the poet John Ashbery 
observes, “words are only speculation” (69), and Clarissa exceeds these multiple 
“speculations” on herself. Indeed, in contrast, Clarissa affirms that “[s]he would not say 
of any one in the world now that they were this or were that” (8). “She would not say of 
herself, I am this, I am that” (9). Implicitly, Clarissa acknowledges that in characterizing 
others, one inevitably, in a sense, falsifies them, for individuals remain far too elusive to 
permit any adequate accounting of themselves.  
Mrs. Dalloway, however, goes further than Jacob’s Room in that it explores the 
way selves remain distanced and unknown to one another while simultaneously 
presenting a seemingly concrete and stable social self apparently engaged with others. 
Having returned home from her morning walk, full of introspections, Clarissa gazes into 
her mirror alone in her room. At this moment, she draws herself into focus, into the 
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semblance of a unified self, while at the same time exposing such an impression as an 
illusion. Looking into her mirror, “collecting the whole of her at one point . . . seeing the 
delicate pink face of the woman who was that very night to give a party; of Clarissa 
Dalloway; of herself,” Clarissa thinks:  
 
How many million times she had seen her face, and always with the same 
imperceptible contraction! She pursed her lips when she looked in the glass. It 
was to give her face a point. That was her self—pointed; dart-like; definite. That 
was her self when some effort, some call on her to be her self, drew the parts 
together, she alone knew how different, how incompatible and composed so for 
the world only into one centre, one diamond, one woman who sat in her drawing-
room and made a meeting-point . . . [she] had tried to be the same always, never 
showing a sign of all the other sides of her—faults, jealousies, vanities, 
suspicions. (37)  
 
 
Clarissa instantiates herself here, though she acknowledges how the self’s complex 
diversity becomes lost in the moment of instantiation: she “had tried to be the same 
always, never showing a sign of all the other sides of her.” As with Jacob, what Clarissa 
is exceeds both what she presents of herself and what others expect of her. And despite 
her seeming concreteness as she looks at herself thinking, “That was herself—pointed; 
dart-like; definite,” that definiteness proves illusory, as the text suggests that beneath 
such superficial unity Clarissa consists of many disunited “parts.” Perhaps most 
importantly though, Clarissa indicates that these “parts” of her are drawn together via an 
encounter with another, as “[t]hat was her self [only] when some effort, some call on her 
to be her self, drew the parts together.” But what others draw into being is not an 
ongoing, developing, dialogically negotiated consciousness, but a role, a mask fitted for 
the occasion. Clarissa does not negotiate otherness as Bakhtin would have it; rather, she 
 11
performs versions of herself when called onto by social convention. But who Clarissa is 
beneath these roles remains diffuse and “disarticulat[ed]” (Porritt 323), an unreachable 
shore.   
Woolf’s emphasis on the distance dividing individuals as well as her technique of 
juxtaposing many variously situated voices to indicate the insufficiency of any 
individual’s understanding of another result in a proliferation of distinctive voices in her 
texts. The manifestation of this polyphony of voices in Woolf’s novels coincides with 
Bakhtin’s own emphasis on the “plurality of independent and unmerged voices and 
consciousnesses” (Problems 6). Bakhtin’s privileging of polyphony reflects his 
assumption that these voices sound together in dialogue with one another; as “polyphony 
presupposes the possibility and asserts the value of meaningful dialogue” (Morson 233-
34). Since Woolf’s novels express such a polyphonic chorus of voices, as voices 
intermingle and interact, one might think such polyphony could not help but indicate at 
some level in Woolf’s novels an affirmation of Bakhtinian dialogism. For as Woolf has 
her characters all interwoven into one another’s’ lives, so it becomes possible to see how 
each influences the other. As J. Hillis Miller suggests in regard to Mrs. Dalloway, “No 
man or woman is limited to himself or herself, but each is joined to others by means of 
this tree, diffused like a mist among all the people and places he or she has encountered” 
(174). 
For instance, in Mrs. Dalloway, Clarissa, Richard, Peter, Sally, and many others 
are bound together by the memory of shared pasts. The Bourton excursions proved 
immeasurably influential on each of these characters in their youth, though in different 
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ways. Indeed, acknowledging that Clarissa “had influenced him more than any person he 
had ever known” (153), Peter remarks to Sally, “His relations with Clarissa [at Bourton] 
had not been simple. It had spoilt his life” (192).3 Old animosities that should have faded 
years ago still affect people’s actions, as when, at Clarissa’s party, Sally sees Hugh, who 
had tried to seduce her and then denied it to others, and yet says nothing to him (189). 
And Clarissa, of course, remains haunted by her memories of Sally. Similarly, in Jacob’s 
Room, each of the characters is linked together via their relationship with Jacob himself. 
Jacob links Bonamy to Mrs. Flanders to Clara to Sandra and so forth in a vast web 
radiating out from himself. Though many of these characters never meet, their lives 
remain intricately and subtly interconnected as Jacob moves back and forth between 
them. 
Nevertheless, despite the interweavings connecting characters, and despite each 
novels’ implicit acknowledgment of the influences individuals have on one another, these 
individuals still remain distanced from one another, for Woolf does not interconnect 
characters dialogically, but existentially. Individuals share the temporal coincidence of 
mutual coexistence, but this does not necessitate dialogical exchange or contact with 
another; indeed, it accentuates the opposite. For example, Woolf writes in a passage from 
Jacob’s Room:  
 
                                                 
3 This passage reveals Woolf’s practice of free-indirect discourse, a method coinciding with what Bakhtin 
refers to as double-voicedness. Bakhtin defines double-voicedness as heteroglossic discourse serving “two 
speakers at the same time and express[ing] simultaneously two different intentions: the direct attention of 
the character who is speaking, and the refracted intention of the author” (“Discourse” 324). Williams-
Gualandi explores this at length in her essay.  
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Mr. Spalding going to the city looked at Mr. Charles Budgeon bound for 
Shepherd’s Bush. The proximity of the omnibuses gave the outside passengers an 
opportunity to stare into each other’s faces. Yet few took advantage of it. Each 
had his own business to think about. Each had his past shut in him like the leaves 
of a book known to him by heart; and his friends could only read the title, James 
Spalding, or Charles Budgeon, and the passengers going the opposite way could 
read nothing at all—save ‘a man with a red moustache,’ ‘a young man in grey 
smoking a pipe.’ (64-65)  
 
 
Individuals remain closed off from one another, unable to “reveal” themselves to the 
other, connected only by their shared physical space. No dialogical engagement of voices 
exists here, no meeting of selves on the boundaries; for these individuals, while socially 
coexisting, going to and from work, nevertheless always remain at an undiminished 
distance from one another that dialogue cannot bridge. One discovers, of course, that 
Jacob was among the anonymous many on the bus. By connecting Jacob to Mr. Spalding 
and Mr. Charles Budgeon, the novel suggests that, like Jacob, all individuals exist in 
anonymity, even as they move and interact in the midst of a multitude of other human 
beings. As if to clinch the point, Jacob gets off the bus here and loses himself in the mass 
of people in and around St. Paul’s Cathedral. Thus, though Woolf posits links or 
interweavings between the polyphonic voices in her texts, she also articulates the distance 
between individuals, indeed suggesting that such a dividing gulf is an unavoidable 
existential property of being human.  
In addition to suggesting that selves lack the psychic contact necessary for 
Bakhtinian dialogue, that individuals remain isolated from one another because they can 
never truly know the other, Woolf also suggests that selves remain isolated from one 
another due to the solitary nature of one’s bodily experiences and perceptions, a notion at 
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variance with Bakhtinian assumptions regarding the body. As discussed above, Woolf 
understands the self as disunited, refusing any “single state of being” for itself, since 
“[c]learly the mind is always altering its focus, and bringing the world into different 
perspectives.” But as the case of Septimus Warren Smith reveals, the body itself 
underpins the mind’s multiple “perspectives,” as the mind is dependent upon the 
“[m]uscles, nerves, intestines, blood-vessels, all that makes the coil and spring of our 
being” (Waves 193). For Bakhtin, “To live means to participate in dialogue: to ask 
questions, to heed, to respond, to agree, and so forth. In this dialogue a person 
participates wholly and throughout his whole life: with his eyes, lips, hands, soul, spirit, 
with his whole body and deeds” (“Toward” 293). But for Woolf, the body impedes 
dialogue, as the body binds the self to the body’s own limited sensual perceptions, 
generating a non-negotiable perspective unique to the individual. As Bernard laments in 
The Waves, “we were all different. The wax—the virginal wax that coats the spine melted 
in different patches for each of us. . . . We suffered terribly as we became separate 
bodies” (178-79). Thus, what the self proves capable of experiencing and understanding 
depends upon the body’s capacities as it is biologically constituted. And, though one may 
presume individuals nonetheless perceive the world similarly enough to adequately 
communicate their experiences of it to others, Woolf complicates such an assumption via 
her treatment of Septimus Warren Smith, whose illness “insulates him from all human 
relationships” (Rosenthal 91).  
In Mrs. Dalloway Septimus finds himself constantly overwhelmed by his senses, 
perceiving the world via his damaged nerves, finding himself both over-sensitized and 
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under-sensitized to his surroundings. As his body inundates him with information and 
sensation, Septimus experiences the natural world with intense vibrancy, “perceiving 
familiar objects as if for the first time” (Ruotolo 103). For Septimus, “leaves were alive; 
trees were alive”; indeed, Septimus feels the leaves “connected by millions of fibres with 
his own body” (22). In Regent’s Park, overhearing a nearby nursemaid deciphering the 
smoke letters of the skywriting airplane, Septimus cannot help but physically internalize 
her voice: “Septimus heard her say ‘Kay Arr’ close to his ear, deeply, softly, like a 
mellow organ, but with a roughness in her voice like a grasshopper’s, which rasped his 
spine deliciously and sent running up into his brain waves of sound which, concussing, 
broke” (22). Septimus apprehends his world materially, translating experience into 
physical sensation. As the narrator remarks, Septimus’ “body was macerated until only 
the nerve fibers were left” (68).  
However, such acute sensitivity also works to sever Septimus from others, as 
human relations prove too much for him. Indeed, since the war, Septimus “could not 
feel” towards others what one supposes he should (86). Alive to the natural world of his 
senses, he is correspondingly numbed to the complex social world of human interactions. 
His wife, Rezia, he refers to as “it” (93) or as the “unseen” (25). In Regent’s Park with 
Rezia, Septimus feels he must get “Away from people—they must get away from people, 
he said” (25). Indeed, in response to Holmes’ approach, Septimus flings himself from the 
window, committing suicide, exclaiming, "I’ll give it you!” (149). And though his “mind 
transmutes everything, connects the most disparate sounds and pictures” (Blackstone 80), 
Septimus cannot share these visions with others. His damaged nerves isolate him from 
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others, marking a border across which nothing may pass. What selves are, Woolf implies, 
is mediated through the self’s own body far more than is dialogically mediated through 
another. For the body’s materiality closes the self off from another, tracing out an 
impermeable boundary overshadowing dialogical relations. As Kenneth Burke points out, 
“the body’s pleasures and pains are exclusively its own pleasures and pains” (130). 
While Septimus’ illness certainly illustrates how the sensual apparatus of the body 
provides the self with incommunicable experiences, thus isolating the self from others, 
this situation proves no less true for those ostensibly healthy. Clarissa herself experiences 
moments wherein her consciousness so fuses with the sense perceptions of her body, that 
her self essentially ceases to exist, and all that remains is bodily perception. And as 
Woolf suggests that in these moments “the boundaries of conscious selfhood dissolve 
into [only an] awareness of basic physical existence” (Littleton 38), transcending social 
context, so she reinforces the absolutely incommunicable and solitary aspect of these 
experiences, reiterating again the boundaries that divide individuals rather than 
dialogism’s generative margins. For instance, reflecting on her years, Clarissa thinks:  
 
She was not old yet. She had just broken into her fifty-second year. Months and 
months of it were still untouched. June, July, August! Each still remained almost 
whole, and, as if to catch the falling drop, Clarissa . . . plunged into the very heart 
of the moment, transfixed it, there—the moment of this June morning on which 
was the pressure of all the other mornings, seeing the glass, the dressing table, and 
all the bottles afresh. (36-37)  
 
 
Clarissa seeks to arrest time, to dissolve herself into the physicality of the moment in 
order to feel the moment that much more. She seeks to so bind herself to the moment, to 
“plunge” into it, that the “I” of the aging, socially defined Mrs. Clarissa Dalloway 
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dissolves into the sensation of this exact instant of bodily existence. But, as this moment 
marks an experience exclusive to Clarissa’s own body, an experience at the level of the 
body in which the everyday-self evanesces, so the experience remains incommunicable 
and necessarily solitary. Indeed, Naremore points out that the experience of “‘reality’ 
here is something apart from the social order of experience, removed from the dialectic of 
active personal relationships, and perhaps even inaccessible by means of language” 
(131). To dissolve oneself into the moment, to “plunge” beneath the social to the 
phenomenological, necessarily implies a retreat from language, as language remains 
complexly social. Thus, as individuals encounter the world through the singular filter of 
their own senses, the body itself circumscribes the self’s interactions with others, often, 
as with Septimus, foreclosing any possibility of dialogue, or, as with Clarissa, 
transcending it.  
In contrast, Bakhtin does not prioritize the body; for Bakhtin does not understand 
the body as filtering or delineating experience for the self, rather, the self filters the 
body’s perceptions through the socially constituted linguistic systems which 
contextualize the individual. Glossing V. N. Voloshinov’s Marxism and the Philosophy 
of Language,4 Eagleton observes that “the domain of signs and the realm of ideology are 
coextensive: consciousness can arise only in the material embodiment of signifiers, and 
since these signifiers are in themselves material, they are not just ‘reflections’ of reality 
but an integral part of it” (194). Bakhtin likewise asserts that “consciousness comes 
                                                 
4 Many dispute Voloshinov’s authorship of this text, arguing instead for Bakhtin himself. Morson and 
Emerson note the controversy around the question: “It is now commonplace for critics to cite Voloshinov’s 
and Medvedev’s works as Bakhtin’s . . . but in fact the authorship of these texts is far from a settled 
question” (102). Regardless, Voloshinov was a member of Bakhtin’s circle, and thus shares a similar view 
on the philosophy of language.  
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second,” as the dialogical self instantiates itself exclusively via the shared sociality of 
language and discourse (“Toward” 290). For Bakhtin, others’ discourse works “to 
determine the very bases of our ideological interrelations with the world, the very basis of 
our behavior” (“Discourse” 342). What Septimus or Clarissa experience through the 
body’s singular senses loses significance as the self’s awareness of such moments can 
only be meaningfully translated to itself through socially preexisting linguistic structures.  
Ban Wang points out that “[w]hen private consciousness is seen as constructed in 
this way, the identity of self becomes an issue that has lost its underlying assumption of 
an original, innate essence. It is the social structure, ideology, language, in short, the 
symbolic order that constitutes the self or rather the subjectivity of these characters” 
(180). Indeed, in Mrs. Dalloway, various characters certainly appear constructed 
according to the discourses within which they are enmeshed. Lady Bruton’s interest in 
emigration betrays her entanglement in imperialist ideology (Wang 181); Clarissa’s 
parties expose her bourgeois consciousness; and Kilman’s religious zealotry reveals her 
immersion in fundamentalist Christian evangelism. In Jacob’s Room Mrs. Durrant’s 
interaction with Mrs. Pascoe uncovers the hierarchical and power-saturated relationship 
between classes (“Mrs. Pascoe listened submissively” [55]); likewise, Bonamy and 
Jacob’s treatment of Mrs. Papworth reinscribes the ideological chasm dividing the classes 
(“They never noticed her” [102]); while the novel’s portrayal of Clara marks the 
gendered scripting of 1920’s bourgeois London. For Bakhtin, these individuals would 
necessarily experience the world solely through their socially prescribed, ideological 
roles, through the discourses structuring their subjectivities, and not through their bodies. 
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Nevertheless, for Woolf, there remains something exclusively personal to an 
individual’s bodily perceptions of the world which escapes ideological reduction. Louise 
Poresky helpfully suggests that Woolf posits two selves for each individual, a 
subterranean Self and a social self, for “[t]he Self, that core or center of the human 
psyche that Woolf’s characters seek, differs from the self, one’s superficial identity” (15). 
Self cannot be contained by self, as Self exceeds self and is the ground upon which the 
social self is laid. For though Woolf certainly acknowledges a social component to 
selfhood, as individuals both respond to others’ influences and perform according to their 
social roles, such sociality is secondary, an accretion upon the existential thusness of the 
body and the body’s immediate apprehension of the world. Thus, in opposition to 
Bakhtin’s assumptions regarding the socially constituted, dialogic conceptualization of 
the self, Woolf’s novels, to appropriate Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phrase, express a 
“phenomenology of perception.” That is, as consciousness expresses itself only as 
consciousness of something, and as perception always grounds itself reflexively in the 
sensory organs of an individual’s own, singular body, so there exists a component to the 
psyche which remains exclusively enclosed within that particular psyche. Individual 
awareness arises as the individual encounters the world through her or his own unique 
sensory apparatus, similar in kind to others, but distinct in its biological instantiation: “I 
can imagine nothing beyond the circle cast by my body” (Woolf, Waves 93).  
However, as much as Woolf privileges the elusive and phenomenological self, she 
nevertheless thrusts her characters into interaction and confrontation with others. For 
though Woolf suggests individuals remain unknowable to each other, and further 
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intimates that bodily materiality isolates individuals, nevertheless, her novels explore the 
ways individuals encounter and respond to one another. Indeed, Woolf’s different 
understanding of how selves socially engage other selves is the place where she most 
challenges Bakhtinian dialogism. For Bakhtin, individuals acknowledge the voice of the 
other while responding to it with their own. As Z. D. Gurevitch observes, “[e]very 
attempt to communicate entails acknowledgment (however implicit) of the other” 
(“Other” 1180). For Woolf, though, interactions between individuals are much more 
problematic than Bakhtin allows, as Woolf suggests individuals do not necessarily 
dialogue as one consciousness in full recognition of another. Rather, individuals, as they 
interact socially with one another, not only perceive the other through the filter of their 
own bodily senses, but also generate narrative constructions which screen in the self and 
distort the other. Such activity reduces dialogue to monologue, revealing yet another 
barrier between self and other.   
In his study Consciousness Explained, the cognitive theorist Daniel Dennett 
suggests that “brains grow self-representations” (430), and that “streams of narrative 
issue forth” from a fictive center we call the self (418). Elsewhere he comments, “We are 
all virtuoso novelists. . . . We try to make all of our material cohere into a single good 
story. And that story is our autobiography” (“Self” 114). Such observations are in no way 
alien to literary theory, for, as Roland Barthes observed years ago, narrative “transforms 
life into destiny, a memory into a useful act, duration into an oriented and meaningful 
time” (39). And Paul Ricoeur asserts that “fiction, particularly narrative fiction, is an 
irreducible dimension of the understanding of the self” (435). But Dennett, like Woolf, 
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foregrounds the body’s singularity in experiencing, filtering, and ordering the world, 
suggesting that the body assumes a more aggressive, more monological, role in 
navigating its environment than appears in models such as Bakhtin’s, where selves 
dialogically respond to others openly, fully, and typically in good faith. Dennett 
maintains that narrative serves as the brain’s chief instrument in confronting its 
environment, as narrative both orders experience and gives rise to a sense of self:  
 
Our fundamental tactic of self-protection, self-control, and self-definition is not 
spinning webs or building dams, but telling stories, and more particularly 
concocting and controlling the story we tell others—and ourselves—about who 
we are. . . . Our tales are spun, but for the most part we don’t spin them; they spin 
us. Our human consciousness, and our narrative selfhood, is their product, not 
their source. (Consciousness 418)  
 
 
Thus, Dennett understands narrative as a strategy for survival. Human beings possess an 
impulse, a drive to order the world which compels selves to construct narratives of 
themselves. Such narratives, though, arise spontaneously within the individual, and are 
not dependent upon a dialogical relationship with another. Consequently, this impulse 
works to close off the possibility for dialogue Bakhtin insists upon, as selves gravitate 
back upon themselves, isolated from others by their own fiction-making capacities.  
Finding resonance with such a model of selfhood in Woolf proves not too 
difficult; indeed Porter Abbott suggests that Woolf’s writings, and especially her fiction, 
reflect Woolf’s own efforts towards establishing a narrative of self. For Woolf, Abbott 
claims, “writing is autogenesis” (399), as Woolf both invents and confirms her idea of 
herself through her writings. Abbott quotes from Woolf’s diary: “I am I; & I must follow 
that furrow, not copy another. That is the only justification for my writing & living” 
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(398). Woolf here asserts the self-narrative within which she will play her part, and which 
lends her life meaning and structure. Woolf’s “autogenesis” reveals a process many of 
her characters engage in, a process in which individuals coalesce around their own 
“center[s] of narrative gravity” (Consciousness 418), bringing meaning to their worlds 
through the narrative they impose upon it. In fact, as Bernard asserts in The Waves, “in 
order to make you understand, to give you my life, I must tell you a story—and there are 
so many, and so many—stories of childhood, stories of school, love, marriage, death, and 
so on; and none of them are true. Yet like children we tell each other stories” (176, 
emphasis added).5 Even Clarissa’s need for her parties illustrates this point, for her 
parties are not only “an offering,” as she phrases it herself (122), but an attempt at “self-
definition” (Littleton 36), and thus a component in her own narrative of self as presented 
to others. Thus, individuals invent the stories of themselves they present others, and 
though “none of them are true,” these stories both define the self and convert experience 
into meaning.  
However, such fabrications impact the relation between self and other, as 
individuals do not recognize the other as they are, but see only the narratives individuals 
weave about themselves. Indeed, more significantly, following another “tactic of self-
protection, self-control, and self-definition,” individuals do not merely generate stories of 
themselves, but also project those narratives onto others, consequently distorting the 
other. Woolf’s lyric sequence in Mrs. Dalloway on the “visions” of the “solitary traveler” 
provides a model for the way individuals both perceive reality according to their own 
                                                 
5 Indeed, as Dennett observes, “of all the things in the environment an active body must make mental 
models of, none is more crucial than the model the agent has of itself” (Consciousness 427). 
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unique narratives, as well as the way individuals project their narrative interpretations of 
the world onto others. In a sense, these narratives also are visions, more structured 
perhaps, but visions nonetheless. As individuals “issue forth” self-narratives, so, for the 
solitary traveler, visions “ceaselessly float up, pace beside, put their faces in front of, the 
actual thing; often overpowering the solitary traveler and taking away from him the sense 
of the earth” (57). The solitary traveler remains at the mercy of her or his own visions, as 
visions mask the “actual thing,” potentially cutting one off from others. The danger, as 
the narrator notes, is that “[n]othing exists outside us except a state of mind” (57). The 
text, though, does not deny the otherness of the other, only the individual’s ability to 
perceive the other independent of the individual’s own “visions,” or “streams of 
narrative,” as Dennett phrases it. Such a relationship with the other works to suppress any 
potential for dialogical exchange, for not only do individuals wrap themselves within 
visions of themselves, but they enwrap the other as well. Consequently, two levels of 
psychic distortion separate one from another, countering the optimism of Bakhtin’s 
claims. 
For example, Peter’s pursuit of the young woman through the streets of London 
illustrates the distorting “visions” of the solitary traveler, as Peter encounters a woman 
from whom he desires no dialogical response. Walking London after he has left 
Clarissa’s, Peter spies a “young woman” who “shed[s] veil after veil” for him “until she 
became the very woman he had always had in mind” (52). As Peter follows the unnamed 
woman, he creates a narrative enmeshing her within his own desires and needs. And 
though this unnamed woman momentarily infuses Peter’s life with excitement and 
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meaning, as Peter seeks connection, intimacy, a return-to-youth, as he seeks someone 
who will know “his private name” (53), nevertheless, Peter merely projects his fantasies 
onto this young woman, distorting her for his pleasure. Peter is aware of his actions, but 
feels “one must invent” (53), that individuals have no choice but to fabricate visions of 
themselves and visions of others, and that these visions are necessarily singular to the 
individual. Peter thinks to himself as he loses sight of the “girl”:  
 
Well, I’ve had my fun . . . And it was smashed to atoms—his fun, for it was half 
made up, as he knew very well; invented, this escapade with the girl; made up, as 
one makes up the better part of life, he thought—making oneself up; making her 
up; creating an exquisite amusement, and something more. But odd it was, and 
quite true; all this one could never share—it smashed to atoms. (54)  
 
 
Narrative, Peter confesses, emerges from the individual as a solitary and willful act. And 
individuals find pleasure in such acts, as these narratives bring significance to the 
individual’s engagement with life. But, though the passage suggests that individuals 
possess the capacity to be cognizant of how they script others, such scripting nevertheless 
does violence to the person scripted. Dialogism emphasizes the “social imbrication of 
voice and response” (Nealon 131), where the individual “explicitly or tacitly 
acknowledges the language of the Other” (Richter 528). Monologism, however, “denies 
the existence and validity of the Other, assuming an auditor to whom one speaks without 
needing to listen” (Richter 528). Certainly, as Peter projects his vision onto this “girl,” 
doing violence to her, he monologically denies her “validity,” and in a sense speaks to 
her “without needing to listen.” Consequently, Woolf’s portrayal of Peter’s experience 
with this woman refutes dialogism’s central emphasis on response, suggesting instead 
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that individuals are much more interested in their own visions than in the voice of the 
other.   
 Though Peter may express some capacity to comprehend how his “visions” 
construct the other he sees, Peter proves the exception. Generally, individuals generate an 
idea of the other which they fully conflate with the other while remaining ignorant of 
their actions. Jacob’s Room provides numerous illustrations of such monological 
constructions. For example, Jacob’s Room first introduces Jacob as a young man through 
the eyes of Mrs. Norman. As Jacob enters the train-carriage, Mrs. Norman observes, 
judges, and quickly assembles in her mind an idea of Jacob based solely on his dress and 
demeanor. Mrs. Norman initially sees the “powerfully built” Jacob as a threat to her 
physical safety: “She would throw the scent-bottle with her right hand . . . and tug the 
communication cord with her left” (30). But this conceptualization of Jacob passes as she 
begins to observe him more closely. “Taking note of socks (loose), of tie (shabby), she 
once more reached his face. She dwelt upon his mouth. The lips were shut. The eyes bent 
down, since he was reading. All was firm, yet youthful, indifferent, unconscious” (30). 
Indeed, the more she watches Jacob, the more she associates him with “her own boy” 
(31). Thus, Mrs. Norman draws a portrait of Jacob, but the portrait reflects herself more 
than Jacob, as Mrs. Norman only sees Jacob through the lens of her construction of him. 
The narrator observes, “Nobody sees any one as he is, let alone an elderly lady sitting 
opposite a strange young man in a railway carriage. They see a whole—they see all sorts 
of things—they see themselves” (30-31).  
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Additionally, like Mrs. Norman, Mrs. Papworth creates her own version of Jacob. 
Overhearing Jacob and Bonamy tussling, as she washes dishes in the other room, she 
misnames Jacob Flanders, “Sanders.” Mrs. Papworth feels that “Sanders was a fine 
young fellow,” and “felt motherly towards them [Sanders and Bonamy]” (102). But who 
is this “Sanders” Mrs. Papworth has, in a sense, created? Whom does she feel motherly 
towards? As with Mrs. Norman, Mrs. Papworth fabricates an image of Jacob; though 
unlike Peter, neither Mrs. Norman nor Mrs. Papworth realizes that she invents the other 
she encounters. Moreover, in both instances, Jacob remains silent, aloof. He does not 
respond to Mrs. Norman on the train, nor does he acknowledge Mrs. Papworth. No 
dialogical movement occurs on the boundary between self and other; the old women 
envision and create their own versions of Jacob, and Jacob ignores them. 
Yet what happens when “visions” come into conflict, as they inevitably will? For 
Woolf’s antithetical relation to Bakhtinian dialogism emerges most clearly when her texts 
illustrate individuals whose narrative of self and vision of the other clash, and where 
neither individual proves capable of responding to the other. In Mrs. Dalloway, 
Bradshaw’s interaction with Septimus reveals how self-blinded individuals can be to one 
another and the tragedy that ensues when individuals refuse to acknowledge the voice of 
the other. In her essay on the “dialogic connection,” Gurevitch asserts that, “In facing, 
one confronts the total otherness of the Other, the impossibility to reduce the other to 
myself” (“Dialogic” 192). And yet Bradshaw proceeds directly “to reduce the other to 
[him]self,” as Bradshaw works to impose his own will onto others. Bradshaw sees others 
only through the lens of his own discourse, and though desirous “for dominion, for 
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power” (101), constructs a narrative of himself in which he justifies his actions in the 
name of “love, duty, [and] self sacrifice” (100). Even his wife “had gone under. It was 
nothing you could put your finger on; there had been no scene, no snap; only the slow 
sinking . . . of her will into his” (100). Although Bradshaw is the physician called in to 
treat Septimus, he has no interest in listening to him. Bradshaw presumes Septimus’ 
illness is caused by Septimus’ need for a “sense of proportion” (96), and that Septimus 
can be cured by going into one of the doctor’s “homes” where Bradshaw “will teach” him 
“to rest” (97). Of course, the sense of proportion Septimus lacks is Bradshaw’s own—
“his, if they were men, Lady Bradshaw’s if they were women” (99). Bradshaw refuses to 
recognize Septimus’ voice, refuses to respond to Septimus, denying him the “equal rights 
of consciousness” (Bakhtin, “Toward” 285). Scathingly, the narrator observes that 
Bradshaw “swooped; he devoured. He shut people up” (102). Bradshaw not only projects 
onto others, as Peter, Mrs. Norman, or Mrs. Papworth do, but seeks to dissolve them 
entirely into himself.  
As Bradshaw remains closed to the voice of the other, so too, however, does 
Septimus, though for different reasons. As discussed above, Septimus’ madness isolates 
him from others, as his constructions of the world, his “visions,” isolate him within his 
mind. But Septimus’ closure, in part, is a defense against the monological violence of 
men like Bradshaw. Though Septimus has done nothing wrong, he feels he has 
“committed an appalling crime and been condemned to death by human nature” (96). 
And yet when Septimus does commit suicide, he does it “in order to preserve his own 
existential unity” (Hawthorne 44). Rather than submit to “visions” of others, Septimus 
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chooses to die to maintain his own visions and sense of inviolable self. Septimus “did not 
want to die. Life was good. The sun hot. Only human beings—what did they want?” 
(149). Thus, Bradshaw’s self-narrative clashes with Septimus’ own vision of himself with 
tragic results.  
The relationship between Clarissa and Doris Kilman likewise reveals the 
incessant construction-making that individuals engage in which subverts sympathetic 
dialogue between selves. Resentful of those who remind her of her insecurities, Kilman 
defensively constructs her own image of Clarissa, believing Clarissa a shallow, bourgeois 
snob, who flits away her life engaged in meaningless activities. For Kilman, Clarissa 
“was not serious. She was not good. Her life was a tissue of vanity and deceit” (128). 
Indeed, Kilman perceives Clarissa as embodying the decadent privileged classes in 
general: Clarissa “came from the most worthless class of all classes—the rich, with a 
smattering of culture. They had expensive things everywhere; pictures, carpets, lots of 
servants” (123). But of course, as the text offers readers the nuanced complexity of 
Clarissa’s interiority, so readers realize that Kilman’s mental representation of Clarissa is 
not truth but perspective. For the depths of Kilman’s disdain for Clarissa matches the 
depths of Kilman’s own self-loathing: “why should she have to suffer when other 
women, like Clarissa Dalloway, escaped?” (129). When Kilman looks on Clarissa, she 
does not see Clarissa, but a torturer.   
But Clarissa likewise misreads Kilman, as Clarissa invents a version of Kilman 
which distorts her. As Elizabeth Primamore notes, “Woolf does not depict Kilman as a 
frightful creature; instead the idea of Kilman as a monster or monster-like is in the mind 
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of Clarissa Dalloway” (127). Jealous of Kilman’s relationship with Elizabeth, Clarissa 
thinks, “This is a Christian—this woman! This woman had taken her daughter from her! 
She in touch with invisible presences! Heavy, ugly, commonplace, without kindness or 
grace, she know the meaning of life!” (125). Indeed, for Clarissa, Kilman proves as much 
a threat to her sense of self as Clarissa proves to Kilman’s, as Clarissa resents Kilman’s 
self-righteous “superiority,” perceiving Kilman as “one of those specters who stand 
astride us and suck up half our life-blood, dominators and tyrants” (12). And though 
Clarissa admits that hatred “was for ideas, not people” (126), nevertheless, Clarissa, 
mirroring Septimus’ reaction to Bradshaw, thinks of how the “odious Kilman would 
destroy [her sense of self]” (127). Sadly, neither Clarissa nor Kilman possesses the 
capacity to sympathetically acknowledge the other; neither sees the other, rather, each 
generates the image of the other with which they then interact, each inventing the object 
of their own scorn.  
Thus, individuals remain inextricably enmeshed in a constant stream of self-
generated and self-generating story, which, while serving to help define a meaningful 
sense of self for individuals, nonetheless contaminates individuals’ perception of others. 
Indeed, such mutually excluding narratives as one sees between Clarissa, Doris, 
Septimus, and Bradshaw, even if extreme examples, demonstrate that for Woolf, dialogue 
often reduces to monologue, contradicting Bakhtin’s own stress on the dialogic 
responsiveness of individuals. Where Bakhtin privileges dialogue, fundamentally 
stressing “the impossibility of the existence of a single consciousness, (“Toward” 287), 
Woolf insinuates otherwise, emphasizing that selves are screened from other selves, as 
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the “visions” of each “ceaselessly float up, pace beside, put their faces in front of” the 
other. Gurevitch asserts that when individuals “look at each Other face-to-face” they 
“redeem themselves from their own thingness, and make a dialogic connection. What is 
born at this moment is recognition” (“Dialogic” 185). However, Woolf suggests that 
when one individual looks at another, she or he does not “recognize” the other as 
Gurevitch claims occurs during the “dialogic connection”; rather, individuals see only the 
stories they weave upon the other: “Nobody sees any one as he is. . . . they see 
themselves” (Jacob’s Room 30-31).  
In his study of Bakhtin, Michael Holquist observes: “It cannot be stressed enough 
that for him [Bakhtin] ‘self’ is dialogic, a relation” (19). As Bakhtin conceives of the self 
as emerging only out of its relation with another, so, for Bakhtin, the self can never be 
understood as solitary or as existing in isolation from another. Recall Bakhtin’s assertion 
that “A person has no internal sovereign territory, he is wholly and always on the 
boundary; looking inside himself, he looks into the eyes of another or with the eyes of 
another” (287). As Bakhtin maintains that selves exist only on the shared boundaries with 
other selves, and as an individual’s interiority arises only through dialogical negotiations 
with the discourses of other selves, so, for Bakhtin, individuals possess no authentic 
interiority exclusive to themselves. What the self is, for Bakhtin, remains exclusively 
social. And though Bakhtin clearly decenters the self, stressing that selves are not solitary 
Cartesian monads, he also implies that selves are not the internally fractured 
consciousnesses that Woolf understands them to be. Bakhtin maintains that individuals 
possess enough internal unity to allow them the capacity to greet others fully and openly: 
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“I am conscious of myself and become myself only while revealing myself for another, 
through another, and with the help of another” (“Toward” 287). Nothing is held back, all 
that a self is is offered up to the other. 
But Woolf’s conceptualization of the self, though not as developed as is 
Bakhtin’s, proves at least as complex. By suggesting that consciousness consists of a 
countless multitude of “states of being,” and that selfhood remains far more diffuse and 
“dilated” than Bakhtin contends (Whitworth 160), Woolf intimates that selves do not 
consist of a singular “social” self constituted solely on the boundaries it shares with 
others, but rather consist of an infinite stratification of social selves grafted upon an 
unknowable, elusive core. Moreover, emphasizing the insurmountable isolation which 
defines relations between individuals, whether the result of the solitary nature of 
perception, or the narratives people use to structure their individual experience, Woolf 
suggests that this core self is much more constitutive of an individual’s private identity 
than Bakhtin’s theory allows. For Woolf, what a self is necessarily precedes the social, 
despite being affected by it. Indeed, privileging individuals’ inaccessible interiorities over 
their social personas, Woolf stresses the preservation of private interiorities as the thing 
most necessary for individual health and wholeness. As Poresky observes, “This center, 
or Selfhood . . . becomes round, whole, and entire only when [individuals] can pursue it 
in solitude” (263). To reiterate Clarissa’s thoughts on the old woman, “that’s the miracle, 
that’s the mystery; that old lady,” alone, separate, yet dignified, “solemn,” and complete 
in her singular otherness (127, 126). Ultimately, Woolf suggests, people are all “solitary 
travelers” whose “privacy of the soul” must be intrinsically valued (Dalloway 57, 126-
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27). And though solitude can oppress, overwhelming individuals with a sense of their 
own isolating otherness, solitude is not necessarily a lamentable state to be understood 
solely in terms of socializing models such as Bakhtin’s. On the contrary, as Bernard 
Blackstone observes, “the solitary mind in its communion with things, with pure life and 
beauty, creates a world of significance: the moment of intuition is achieved, the flash of 
understanding in which time stands still and there is perfect happiness” (250).  
As discussed above, Bakhtin affirms that “To be means to communicate. . . . To 
be means to be for another, and through the other, for oneself” (“Toward” 287). Woolf, 
however, offers an alternative vision. As selves elude one another, remaining always 
mysterious and unknown, so Woolf reinforces the idea of an unbridgeable distance 
separating individuals. No matter what the novel tells the reader about Jacob, for 
instance, Jacob remains an “unyielding surface” (Newman 33), as he retreats from the 
boundary where self and other dialogically coexist: “the essential thing, has moved off.” 
Furthermore, Woolf resists dialogism’s emphasis on the sociality of selves as she 
suggests that individuals encounter the world exclusively through the materiality of their 
own singular bodies. Bodily perceptions, she intimates, prove much more fundamental 
than an individual’s relationship to another. Woolf would perhaps agree with Hume, who 
notes, “For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always 
stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or 
hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and 
never can observe any thing but the perception” (300). Indeed, as Woolf suggests that 
individuals’ perceptions of others is filtered through the body, so she also implies that 
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such perceptions are contaminated by narrative constructions, in which an individual 
cannot see the other because the individual sees only herself. Thus, instead of dialogue, 
too often only monologue remains. Ultimately though, Woolf’s juxtaposition with 
Bakhtin reveals a better understanding of her intuition of what a self is. For her belief that 
selves remain isolated from one another requires a different conceptualization of the self 
than Bakhtin’s relational understanding, where selves engage other selves “wholly” with 
their entire being (“Toward” 293). For Woolf, the “solitary traveler” must be understood 
as grounded in the existential mystery of being itself, and not necessarily in its relation to 
another. By thus emphasizing the absolute otherness of individuals, Woolf in fact 
amplifies their voices, affirming individuals’ inviolable “privacy of the soul.”  
Julia Briggs notes Woolf’s preoccupation with “what makes up our consciousness 
when we are alone and when we are with others” (“Novel” 72). Of course, this was 
Bakhtin’s concern as well. But Woolf and Bakhtin’s respective understandings of the self 
and the self’s relation to others could not be more opposed, even though they wrote 
relatively contemporaneous to one another. As a Soviet critic, Bakhtin, perhaps not 
surprisingly, advocates a theory of the self based exclusively on individuals’ “social 
imbrication” (Nealon 131). And Woolf, writing in England, preoccupied with modernist 
aesthetic and thematic concerns regarding form and representation, suggests an 
understanding of the self that emphasizes individuals’ interpersonal alienation. Yet 
significantly, in the end both Woolf and Bakhtin similarly struggle to explain the way 
individuals interact and engage with one another. But where Bakhtin formulates an 
optimistic dialogic theory of self and other which privileges understanding between 
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people, Woolf pursues her “lifetime concern with the barriers placed on our complete 
understanding of others” (McCracken 63). Paradoxically though, as much as Woolf 
emphasizes the distance dividing people, she also quietly expresses a hope that 
individuals might share some connection with one another, a hope echoing Bakhtin’s 
own optimism. As Naremore observes, “all of Mrs. Woolf’s major characters . . . long for 
an ‘embrace,’ a merging of the self with someone or something outside” (124).  
This shared hopefulness, explicit in Bakhtin, implicit in Woolf, ironically 
illustrates a final difference between the two, a difference which most succinctly 
illuminates Woolf’s understanding of the relationship between self and other. Near the 
beginning of Jacob’s Room, when Jacob is still a boy, his brother Archer searches vainly 
for him on the beach, calling out “Ja—cob! Ja—cob!” The narrator observes, “The voice 
had an extraordinary sadness. Pure from all body, pure from all passion, going out into 
the world, solitary, unanswered, breaking against rocks—so it sounded” (8-9). So, Woolf 
would suggest, all individuals proceed forth. But what is most striking about this passage 
is not its reiteration of humankind’s solitary state, but its emphasis on the call made out to 
the other. For Woolf, “[t]o be” means not “to communicate,” as Bakhtin would have it, 
but to try to communicate, to strive to connect with another while nonetheless 
acknowledging that the other escapes the call. Though Woolf affirms the “supreme 
mystery” that “here was one room; there another” (Dalloway 127), nevertheless, as she 
notes in Jacob’s Room, individuals never cease trying “to penetrate” through to the other 
(93). Using letters and telephones to “symbolize the human effort to connect” (Rosenthal 
84), Woolf affirms, “Yet letters are venerable; and the telephone valiant, for the journey 
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is a lonely one, and if bound together by notes and telephones we went in company, 
perhaps—who knows?—we might talk by the way” (Jacob’s Room 93).  
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“SO, I CALLED MYSELF PIP”: VOICE, AUTHORITY, AND 
THE MONOLOGICAL SELF IN GREAT EXPECTATIONS 
 
In his article “Anti-Oedipalizing Great Expectations: Masochism, Subjectivity, 
Capitalism,” Douglas Steward asserts that “Pip’s psyche, . . . from his earliest memory, is 
of a passive nature. . . . Pip does not declare an identity of himself” (34). For Steward, 
Pip’s subjectivity is structured “in terms of objectification and subjection” (37), as Pip is 
acted upon by others, becoming only what these others make of him. Steward’s 
explication of Pip thus posits a relatively powerless Pip, a Pip whose relation to others is 
characterized by his subjection to their psychosocial authority over him. However, in his 
analysis, Steward makes no note of Pip’s control over the text, even though Great 
Expectations is Pip’s tale told by Pip himself. As the animating voice behind his own 
narrative, Pip cannot be understood as a passive entity, for the power he wields in his 
capacity to represent himself and others trumps any notion of his passivity. In other 
words, as Pip’s narrative is a narrative engendered by Pip’s own voice, no reading that 
does not account for the privileged position of Pip’s voice can be said to adequately 
explain Pip’s relation to the other voices in his narrative. Pip’s relation to others must be 
viewed in essentially political terms, as his voice constitutes a marker of his power over 
and above their voices in his narrative.  
In his study on voice in fiction, Alan Singer notes that for the Russian critic 
Mikhail Bakhtin, “the concept of voice is indistinguishable from the concept of dialogue” 
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(174), as dialogue involves the relational interplay of voices and their utterances. For 
Bakhtin, voices are not isolated monads, but dialogical counterparts, as they commingle 
in good conscience and in full consciousness with others, and where to see an other is to 
see an other with whom one can relate. As Michael Holquist notes, “It is a cardinal 
assumption of dialogism that every human subject is not only highly conscious, but that 
his or her cognitive space is coordinated by the same I/other distinctions that organize my 
own” (Dialogism 33). What Steward overlooks, voice, is exactly what Bakhtin privileges; 
but conversely, as with Steward, Bakhtin’s notion of voice does not acknowledge the 
power of the speaking, narrating voice to distort the voices of others. As such, Great 
Expectations is positioned to expose limitations in Bakhtin’s theorizations. For, although 
Dickens’ novel appears full of diverse and distinctive voices engaged in mutual dialogical 
interchange, in the end, by illustrating the authoritative centrality of Pip’s voice, the novel 
suggests that relations between individuals are troubled by power struggles, wherein 
voices contest over who will possess authoritative primacy. In short, this paper will 
explore the role of voice and narrative authority in Great Expectations in light of 
Bakhtinian theory, arguing that Pip’s active role as narrator of his own story, as he both 
represents others and responds to them, complicates not only the Bakhtinian descriptive 
monological/dialogical narrative dichotomy, but also troubles Bakhtin’s exclusively 
dialogic (I/other) conceptualization of how selves are constituted. In its place, Great 
Expectations posits an interrelated model of narrative and selfhood based on a 
monological understanding of the self’s relation to others. 
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Bakhtin privileges dialogical discourse over monological, as dialogical discourse 
“explicitly or tacitly acknowledges the language of the Other, the controlling presence of 
a social context” (Richter 528). In this model, multiple, distinctive, interactive voices 
emerge from the text, decentering any singular, centralizing narrative voice, even that of 
the author. In contrast, monological discourse “denies the existence and validity of the 
Other, assuming an auditor to whom one speaks without needing to listen” (Richter 528). 
Such discourse is marked by an omnipresent “mastervoice” which “unifie[s] the world in 
a singular interpretive center” (Miller 25). Monological discourse thus seeks to repress 
polyphony, that no other voices might emerge to de-center the dominant discourse. 
Whether fictional narratives are ostensibly dialogical or monological depends, obviously, 
on the text’s strategies of representation, for the text’s construction exposes its implicit 
assumptions regarding how individuals respond to each other. Indeed, whether a text 
appears monological or dialogical is related to the conceptualization of selfhood it 
expounds. In “Discourse in the Novel,” Bakhtin asserts that “consciousness awakens to 
independent ideological life precisely in a world of alien discourses surrounding it” 
(345). For Bakhtin, the individual, as a speaking individual, is necessarily a dialogical 
product of her or his negotiations with others, as each person responds incessantly to the 
discourse of others, internalizing others’ utterances while concurrently sharing her or his 
own. Though Bakhtin acknowledges the influence of “authoritative discourse” in 
contradistinction to “internally persuasive discourse” (“Discourse” 342), nevertheless, he 
appears to assume that such dialogical interchange is untroubled by the possibility that 
 43
individuals may engage in “bad faith” dialogue, where the struggle for one’s own 
authority in the expression of some Nietzschean will-to-power corrupts the exchange.  
In Great Expectations, Pip does not dialogue with the other characters in the 
narrative in a way that dialogically “acknowledges the language of the Other”; rather, he 
reacts to them as objects onto whom he can inscribe his own story. For Pip, as we will 
see, works to author others in his story as much as he works to author himself, and 
negates those who might destabilize his own textual centrality. And though it might be 
argued that Pip is dialogically constructed as he acts on and responds to the influences of 
others, as his voice does negotiate amongst other voices, nevertheless, these experiences 
are characterized not by Pip’s acknowledgment of others per se, that key component of 
dialogism, but rather by his implicit and incessant monological subordination of others to 
his own position, as his own voice comes to dominate the text. Indeed, Pip’s relation to 
the other voices in his narrative is linked directly with Pip’s conceptualization of his own 
voice and its textually central position. For Pip does not only exercise his narrative 
authority to represent others, but most fundamentally, himself, revealing an initial 
understanding of selfhood which will inform his engagement with others, and which is 
directly at odds with Bakhtin’s notions.  
Gail Houston notes that as soon as Great Expectations commences, the reader is 
confronted “with this question of who ‘made’ Pip” (17), and the narrator Pip, having no 
other explanations, immediately suggests himself: “So, I called myself Pip, and came to 
be called Pip” (3). As the reader learns, Pip is an orphan, estranged from his own origins, 
and must autogenously invent for himself a narrative of his own identity, granting himself 
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the power to construct his own bildungsroman. But, as no narrative represents an 
objective position, especially autobiographical self-narrative, so Pip’s presumption to tell 
his own story is immediately complicated by its own initial tautologies: Who tells the 
story of Pip? Pip does. Who is Pip? He is the one who tells the story of Pip. In a 
mirroring suggestive of Lacan’s theories concerning the genesis of the ego, the narrating 
Pip perceives an image of himself in the past and construes it to intimate a sense of unity 
in the narrator’s present. In other words, Pip superimposes his idea of the past on his past, 
presenting it monologically from his own singular perspective in the present. Pip does not 
merely recount his past, but imaginatively (re)constructs it, infusing it with a unity of 
form not necessarily there originally. Pip’s self-naming is thus his inaugural monological 
gesture, wherein he claims authoritatively that he is master of his own representation and, 
by that token, master of himself.  
Consequently, as Pip expresses “his belief in his own freedom to name” (Morris 
944), and asserts that “Pip is made by Pip in the telling” (Gold qtd. in Morris 944), so Pip 
implicitly indicates what the nature of his relationship to others will be: an agonistic 
subordination of their voices to his own. For instance, in the cemetery, observing the 
graves of his family, Pip constructs his nascent self-narrative from their silent 
tombstones. Pip’s monological stance is immediately iterated, as Pip, addressing the 
tombstones, asserts his narrative authority, fabricating an identity out of these 
unresponsive markers of absent others. Indeed, Pip declaratively remarks of his deceased 
younger brothers that they “gave up trying to get a living, exceedingly early in that 
universal struggle,” having been born, Pip imagines, “with their hands in their trousers-
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pockets” (3). Pip implicitly privileges himself over his brothers, for he has not given up: 
Pip is the one who survives; his hands are not passively hidden in his pants pockets, but 
actively engaged in inventing his life as he writes his bildungsroman.6 And though the 
narrating Pip observes that the young Pip “unreasonably” fantasizes what his family was 
like, regardless, the narrator reflects that it is here where he initially senses “the identity 
of things” (3, emphasis added), where he senses the distinctiveness of his own voice and 
the world as revealed by that voice. Peter Brooks rightly notes that Pip here engages in 
“the making of a fiction unaware of its status as fictionmaking” (517). This is precisely 
the point, for Pip naturalizes his sense of his own origins by asserting the primacy of his 
voice. In direct contradiction to Steward, for whom, as stated above, “Pip does not 
declare an identity of himself” (37), Pip proactively asserts an identity from the start. 
Thus, Pip scripts himself a self-unifying subject facing the vastness of a world not-Pip, a 
world he will attempt to will into shape in his narrative, though not without difficulty. 
Pip’s story begins here, seemingly ex nihilo, as he asserts his textual authority, an 
authority which implies both the power to mold himself and to mold others.  
Writing of narrative power, Caryl Emerson notes, “the writer of novels has an 
implicated voice. He can enter and manipulate, fuse or distribute his voice among 
characters. Or he can—and this requires an extra measure of commitment to freedom—
grant autonomy to his characters” (259). Fully implicated in his own narrative, Pip 
expresses his authoritative power over others via his representations of them, denying his 
                                                 
6 Pip exposes the bourgeois ideology underlying his world-view, implicitly affirming a universe that 
supposedly rewards hard work, where individuals can surmount oppressive socioeconomic structures if 
only they figuratively remove their hands from their pockets. Pip’s view of the world itself is thus 
monological, where selves, envisioned as monads, self-author themselves.  
 46
characters “autonomy” as he manipulates their images and their voices. Indeed, as Pip 
will demonstrate, the I/other dialogue, when embedded in representations controlled by 
only one party, is never untroubled by questions of power. This is evident from the 
moment Pip introduces the reader to Mrs. Joe and Joe, as he represents each as inferior to 
himself, indicating and asserting the primacy of his voice over theirs. Pip infantilizes Joe 
and represents Mrs. Joe as nothing more than a “shrew” (114), refusing her even her own 
name (a particularly egregious slight, for disallowing her her own name erodes any trace 
of a representation independent of Pip’s own). Catherine Waters notes that Pip’s “portrait 
of Mrs. Joe betrays the internalised guilt of the adult narrator” (152), and indeed, so does 
his portrait of Joe, as Pip intimates his rather ambivalent shame over having desired for 
himself great expectations. But, beyond Waters’ comment, Pip’s portrayal of both Mrs. 
Joe and Joe illustrates Pip’s own fundamental concern over who has authority in Pip’s 
story of becoming. Because Mrs. Joe in particular exercises the power of raising Pip “by 
hand” (7), directly threatening to overshadow Pip’s voice with her own, so Pip works 
doubly to contain her, subordinating her voice through his representation of her.  
Pip’s representation of Mrs. Joe largely centers on his humorous, seemingly 
innocuous portrait of her personality. But Pip figuratively isolates Mrs. Joe via his 
satirical caricature of her, as Mrs. Joe, described as “tall and bony, and almost always . . . 
[wearing] a coarse apron . . . and having a square impregnable bib in front . . . stuck full 
of pins and needles” (8), suggests the image of an individual who “repels any movement 
towards an embrace” (Waters 153). In this manner, Pip marks Mrs. Joe as 
unapproachable, intimating that there will be no sympathetic recognition of her otherness, 
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as he confines her voice to his caricature of her. To appropriate language from The 
Madwoman in the Attic, Pip pens, sentences, and frames Mrs. Joe, containing her within 
his own filtered representation of her (Gilbert and Gubar 13). Moreover, Pip defuses the 
prime indicator of Mrs. Joe’s potential textual power—her apparent cruelty—when he 
playfully writes, “Knowing her to have a hard and heavy hand, and to be much in the 
habit of laying it upon her husband as well as upon me, I supposed that Joe Gargery and I 
were both brought up by hand” (8).  Beating Pip, she also beats Joe. Again, the caricature 
is humorous, and the image that might have been conveyed of a powerful, authoritative 
personality is undercut. But so, however, is Mrs. Joe’s humanity, for her voice is 
consequently negated by this humor, subsumed into Pip’s narrative.7  
Ultimately, Pip is not interested in painting Mrs. Joe as she is, but only as he 
would have her be, which suggests a disingenuous quality to Pip’s hyperbolic 
representation of her. Significantly, as Waters notes, “The imaginative relish with which 
Mrs. Joe’s atrocities are recorded, and the comic delight with which her pretensions are 
displayed for ridicule, have the effect of throwing the moral discourse of the adult 
narrator into question” (153). Pip does not recollect the actual Mrs. Joe from his 
childhood, but, in a morally ambiguous act, (re)constructs her character to suit his own 
vision, distorting her image for his own discourse. Absent Pip’s “imaginative relish,” 
what would Mrs. Joe look like? How much does Pip exaggerate her personality? How 
might her own self-representation be different? In the end, perhaps these are futile 
                                                 
7 Indeed, by refusing Mrs. Joe representation in a realist mode, by confining her merely to a cartoon version 
of herself, Pip not only dehumanizes her, but, by juxtaposition, encourages readers’ sympathy and 
identification solely with Pip himself. 
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questions, for, as Rodolphe Gasche remarks, autobiography, “as a discourse of attempted 
synthesis of the ontological identity of the self,” necessarily is “a discourse of authority . . 
. a discourse where the other is transformed into a barbarian” (573).8 The representation 
of Mrs. Joe’s violence is thus matched by the inescapable violence of Pip’s 
representation. One senses here Pip’s struggle for control over the text via his control of 
another’s voice, as such control marks a seeming mastery over his own sense-of-self. In 
his short study on Bakhtin and Levinas, Jeffrey Nealon observes that dialogism possesses 
a “distinctly ethical character,” and that “if social space is understood as a rich dialogue 
of voices rather than a fight for recognition and domination, then the other is not 
necessarily a menacing or hostile force” (131). But Pip does not understand “social space 
. . . as a rich dialogue,” as Nealon affirms. Rather, Pip sees social space as precisely “a 
fight for recognition and domination,” where the other is a “menacing or hostile force” 
who must be subsequently subdued. Thus, by controlling Mrs. Joe via his representation 
of her, by marking her as mere caricature not to be taken seriously, Pip undercuts 
dialogism’s emphasis on negotiating voices, and substitutes instead a hierarchical vision 
where voices overshadow and overpower other voices.  
Furthermore, as Pip uses humor to regulate Mrs. Joe’s representation, Pip also 
uses humor to contain Joe, as when Pip and Joe engage in their bread eating 
“competition” and Pip shocks Joe by apparently eating all his bread in one go (11). For 
though Joe treats Pip with respect and a sense of equality, Pip humorously caricatures Joe 
as passively childlike and simple. Indeed, Pip acknowledges that, “I always treated him 
                                                 
8 Although of course fiction, Great Expectations reproduces many of the conventions of autobiography, 
thus opening itself up to the same critiques as autobiography. 
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as a larger species of child, and as no more than my equal” (9). But what is menacing 
about Joe is not a brutal or forceful personality threatening to overwhelm Pip, but rather 
Joe’s kind and patient demeanor, which unceasingly stimulates a monitoring guilt in Pip, 
as if Joe were some projection of Pip’s superego. Perhaps more significantly, Joe denotes 
Pip’s own socioeconomic status, a status which Pip, after encountering Estella, “becomes 
ashamed of . . . [but] cannot escape” (Davies 95). As Great Expectations, in its most 
direct reading, concerns the adolescent Pip’s desires to escape his socioeconomic origins, 
so Pip’s need to negate those who mark his socioeconomic origins becomes manifest. In 
short, using humor to diminish Joe, to suggest that he is a dullard, Pip re-proclaims his 
own authority. Joe must be infantilized that Pip might conceal his own anxieties.9  
Thus, Pip’s humorous characterization of Joe reflects more on Pip than on Joe, 
suggesting that Joe’s representation, like Mrs. Joe’s, is not reliable, as Pip scripts Joe’s 
character according to his own designs. One particular passage however, concerning the 
fight between Joe and Orlick, betrays not only the way Pip filters Joe’s image, but also 
how hard Pip must work to control that image. Guided by the narrative voice, the reader’s 
expectations and assumptions concerning Joe tend to correspond to Pip’s depiction of Joe 
as thoroughly childlike. Although Joe is a blacksmith, the reader does not generally 
envision Joe as a large, powerful, mature adult. However, Joe’s physical strength and 
prowess are surprisingly evinced when he pummels Orlick. Indeed, after the fight, 
noticing that Mrs. Joe has fainted, “Joe unlocked the door and picked up [Pip’s] sister . . . 
                                                 
9 Waters observes that even the “sentimentality of Pip’s apostrophes [concerning Joe] betrays the idealising 
imagination of the narrator, suggesting that more is being said here about his anxieties and obsessions than 
about the ‘reality’ of Joe’s position” (154). 
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[and] carried [her] into the house” (115). Though only for an instant, Joe takes charge, 
while Pip melts into the background. How is it Joe has behaved in such a manner as 
apparently defies Pip’s general portraiture of Joe? As with Mrs. Joe, one asks what else 
about Joe is hidden or repressed in Pip’s representation that might have been revealed 
under different circumstances. James Davies notes “the complexities of [Pip’s] 
unreliability” as an objective narrating voice (94). Such a surprising passage confirms 
Davies’ observation while also intimating the power inherent (though sometimes latent) 
in the representing voice. 
In representing these personalities, Pip must literally represent the speaking 
voices of others. But as author of his text, Pip in fact invents these utterances attributed to 
others, and just how much of others’ voices are actually lodged in the words Pip assigns 
to them cannot be known. Bakhtin would have Pip’s voice move in mutual dialogic 
exchange with others’ voices, since for Bakhtin authors must negotiate through the 
polyglot world of “internally persuasive discourses” to establish their own autonomous 
discourse (“Discourse” 348). Authors’ voices must commingle with others’, and do so 
apparently in good faith. A Bakhtinian reading might also lead one to assume that Pip’s 
scripting other characters’ voices could be said to be dialogical, double-voiced 
discourse.10 But though such double-voicedness is often found in “comic, ironic or 
parodic discourse” (Bakhtin, “Discourse” 324), nevertheless, Pip’s action is not merely to 
parody other voices in his narrative, or hybridize his voice with their own, but to regulate 
                                                 
10 That is, heteroglossic discourse serving “two speakers at the same time and express[ing] simultaneously 
two different intentions: the direct intention of the character who is speaking, and the refracted intention of 
the author” (Bakhtin, “Discourse” 324). 
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them, or even negate them, that his own voice might maintain its textual centrality. So 
Pip, concerned as he is over his own textual authority, troubles this I/other metalinguistic 
relationship Bakhtin establishes.  
For example, how is Joe’s speaking voice wrapped up in Pip’s representation of 
it? Significantly, whereas Joe’s speech, Joe’s voice, is represented via a vernacular 
expressive of his social status, Pip’s voice, even when he is a child in the tale, is always 
the bourgeois voice of an adult authority figure. Never does Pip’s voice betray his own 
true socioeconomic status or maturity level. Joe’s voice is thus implicitly undercut, as Pip 
construes Joe’s language to denote Pip’s own position, consequently containing Joe by 
confining Joe’s voice to a limited range of articulations. For instance, near the beginning 
of the novel, Pip intimates their disparity, as the boy Pip attempts to teach the adult Joe:  
 
   “How do you spell Gargery, Joe?” I asked him, with a modest patronage. 
   “I don’t spell it at all,” said Joe. 
   “But supposing you did?” 
   “It can’t be supposed,” said Joe. “Tho’ I’m oncommon fond of reading, 
too.” 
   “Are you, Joe?” 
   “On-common. Give me,” said Joe, “a good book, or a good newspaper, 
and sit me down afor a good fire, and I ask no better. Lord!” he continued, 
. . . “when you do come to a J and a O, and says you, ‘Here, at last, is a J-
O, Joe,’ how interesting reading is!” 
   I derived from this, that Joe’s education, like Steam, was yet in its 
infancy. (45-46) 
 
 
Though humorous, Joe’s diction and syntax here mark the sociopolitical difference Pip 
imagines exists between them, a difference which elevates Pip at Joe’s expense. Where 
on the surface Pip appears to be engaged in open exchange with a fully acknowledged 
Joe, whose language does seem at first indicative of polyphony as his voice appears 
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distinctively itself, in fact Pip perpetually subverts Joe’s voice in his representation of 
that voice, betraying the false dialogism characterizing their relationship. As Pip attempts 
to represent Joe’s voice, he illustrates what Bakhtin discusses as the “problem of the 
image of a language” (“Discourse” 337). Bakhtin suggests that the image of a language, 
as hybrid of two voices (the author-narrator’s and the character’s), “is precisely the 
perception of one language by another language, its illumination by another linguistic 
consciousness,” though presumably untroubled by questions of power and the potential 
disingenuousness or outright deceptiveness of one party or another (359). But Pip does 
not perceive Joe’s language as a marker of Joe’s otherness, but as a means for containing 
and diminishing him, for their linguistic disparity marks a disparity of power. Rather than 
permitting the inter-illumination of voices, Pip’s representation of Joe’s utterances serves 
to deny Joe’s voice. Thus, yet again, Pip’s representational strategies work to negate the 
voices of others that Pip’s own voice might maintain its authoritative centrality.      
Marx famously asserts that “As individuals [materially] express their life, so they 
are,” but Pip, remarkably, seems to contend, as I portray people, so they are (37). 
Narrative authority grants one the power to write others into being in such a way as to 
ensure one’s own centrality. As Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar observe, “precisely 
because a writer ‘fathers’ his text, his literary creations . . . are his possession, his 
property. Having defined them in language and thus generated them, he owns them, 
controls them, and encloses them on the printed page” (12). This suggests that narrative 
authority necessarily complicates the nature of the dialogical self/other relationship, often 
resulting in the silencing of the other. Moreover, according to Daniel Dennett, “Our 
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fundamental tactic of self-protection, self-control, and self-definition is . . . telling stories, 
and more particularly concocting and controlling the story we tell others—and 
ourselves—about who we are” (418). Because individuals are generally not interested in 
being actors in others’ narratives, they contest with each other over narrative primacy. If, 
as Kenneth Burke suggests, “verbal act[s]” function as “symbolic action” (Philosophy 8), 
then Pip’s narrative can be construed as Pip’s own attempt, through the rhetoric of his 
narrative representations, to willfully assert his own meaning upon the world surrounding 
him, for “wherever there is ‘meaning,’ there is ‘persuasion’” (Burke, Rhetoric 172).11 
Bakhtin’s dialogical model has difficulty accommodating the rhetorical maneuvering 
individuals engage in to ensure the categorical elevation of their perspectives over 
others’. For if “language is always already rhetorical” (Crusius 101), then there exists a 
hierarchical struggle between voices, and not merely a dialogical one, or at least the 
idealized dialogical model present for Bakhtin. 
It is not only Pip’s rhetoric-driven representations of the other that demonstrates 
his desire for centrality within the narrative and undermines aspects of Bakhtinian 
dialogism. Exploring Pip’s “bad faith,” Christopher Morris rather scathingly observes: 
“Pip’s relation with all characters is self-serving, even when he claims to be acting 
altruistically, and in his narration he occasionally covers this seemingly irreducible 
egotism with a veneer of disingenuous contrition” (941). Bakhtin is often accused of a 
certain naivety regarding the dialogical relations between speaking persons,12 as he 
                                                 
11 Contrast with Bakhtin, for whom the “relation to meaning is always dialogic” (Speech 121). 
12 Timothy Crusius, for instance, cites the excessive “idealism” in Bakhtin’s system (196); Aaron Fogel 
complicates Bakhtin by stressing the problem of “coerced speech,” observing that “most real dialogue is 
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assumes dialogue occurs across relatively open, permeable boundaries, where individuals 
see each other and themselves in the other, with neither vantage hindered by masks. But 
Pip exposes a weakness in dialogism here in that Pip often demonstrates “self-serving” 
insincerity or even deceptiveness in his dealings with others; in other words, he dons 
masks. And this insincerity, of course, becomes another means of imposing authority 
over the narrative and over others as Pip manipulates people’s responses to him.  
For instance, in addition to marginalizing Mrs. Joe’s voice via his representation 
of her character, Pip also controls Mrs. Joe by explicitly lying to her. When Pip first 
returns from Miss Havisham’s, he invents an elaborate narrative to evade Mrs. Joe’s and 
Pumblechook’s questions. Though Pip claims he lies only out of fear of being 
misunderstood or of having Miss Havisham misunderstood, he immediately undercuts 
this self-justification by suggesting the real reason for his lying centers on his frustration 
and indignation at his sister’s and Pumblechook’s attempts to force him to talk. Pip 
complains of his sister that “I soon found myself getting heavily bumped from behind in 
the nape of the neck and the small of the back, and having my face ignominiously shoved 
against the kitchen wall, because I did not answer those questions at sufficient length” 
(65). Pip compounds this comment with a reflection on Pumblechook: “The worst of it 
was that that bullying old Pumblechook, preyed upon by a devouring curiosity to be 
informed of all I had seen and heard, came gaping over . . . at tea-time” (66). Resenting 
their apparent power to control his voice, to appropriate his voice for their pleasure, Pip 
bends the truth to his will, seeking to negate their power by subverting that power with 
                                                                                                                                                 
variously constrained and forced” (174); and Michael Bernstein notes “how abstract and idealized 
Bakhtin’s notion of a full dialogue really is” (200).  
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lies. For Pip, the importance of the epistemological truth-status of his statements or the 
importance of “good faith” dialogue with others is thus less significant than his own 
textual authority. Ultimately, as Barry Westburg notes, “lying involves knowing oneself 
as an object for others” (131), and, conversely, treating others as objects. Thus, Pip, by 
lying, evades dialogical exchange in order to establish monological authority, employing 
his voice to control and undercut others. It must be added, however, that Pip does feel a 
degree of guilt over his manipulation of Mrs. Joe and Pumblechook, but “only as 
regarded [Joe]—not in the least as regarded the other two. Towards Joe, and Joe only, I 
considered myself a young monster” (69). Pip confesses to Joe to ease his conscience. 
But although Joe wisely reminds Pip “that lies is lies” (71), nonetheless, Pip persists in 
his deception, thereby undermining his own confession.  
Pip’s disingenuousness is not limited to the overt and obvious instance of a lie, 
but manifests itself in quieter, more subtle ways, as he also suppresses others merely by 
ignoring them, minimizing voices by evading them. In particular and in contrast to his 
representation of Mrs. Joe and Joe, Pip seemingly engages Biddy in a manner more 
suggestive of genuine exchange, controlling her voice less, thereby allowing Biddy to 
emerge as a more authentic self. However, this too is ultimately misleading as an instance 
of dialogism, for Pip still does not acknowledge Biddy’s voice. Rather, Pip uses Biddy to 
indulge his own voice, while ignoring hers; he does not see Biddy as Biddy, but as an 
object onto whom he can project himself. He does not listen to her or acknowledge her 
otherness; and when she speaks discomfiting truths to him, Pip works to undercut her 
comments, suggesting she is motivated by “a bad side of human nature” (149). For 
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example, when Biddy and Pip converse shortly after she moves into his house, Pip 
confesses to her his psychosexual obsession with Estella, and, though the narrator Pip 
acknowledges “Biddy was the wisest of girls” (129), nevertheless, Pip’s and Biddy’s 
conversation here is not dialogical. Recall David Richter’s gloss on Bakhtin’s 
terminology discussed earlier, in which Richter writes that dialogical discourse 
“explicitly or tacitly acknowledges the language of the Other,” while monological 
discourse “denies the existence and validity of the Other, assuming an auditor to whom 
one speaks without needing to listen.” With Biddy, Pip “assumes an auditor to whom [he] 
speaks without needing to listen.” Pip tells Biddy what he feels and what he wants, but 
never realizes how narcissistic his conversation with Biddy appears: “I am not at all 
happy as I am.” He wishes “to be a gentleman” (127). The conversation revolves around 
Pip, around his happiness or lack thereof; and Biddy’s voice is dampened, as the 
representation centers predominantly on Pip’s egocentric consciousness. Though Pip does 
not negate Biddy in the same way he negates others, nevertheless, Biddy helps illustrate 
Pip’s utter self-absorption, his inability to “acknowledge the language of the Other,” and 
how, even when he is not actively seeking to negate others by manipulating their images, 
he nonetheless either usurps or masks their voices through other means.  
Complicating this reading, however, it must be noted that the narrating Pip, as he 
establishes the relationship between the young Pip and Biddy, casts himself in an ironic 
light, intimating the immaturity of his younger self, and in a sense undermining his own 
voice. However, such a moment only reiterates how the narrating Pip scripts himself, 
invents himself, controls not only the representation of others, but his self-representation 
 57
too. For in the interaction between Pip and Biddy, one senses Pip’s representational 
strategies, as he allows readers to perceive his own selfish treatment of Biddy to better 
illustrate the curve of his development over the course of the story. Unlike the young Pip, 
the reader senses Biddy’s unrequited desires, though they are muffled. Indeed, it becomes 
painfully apparent how deaf Pip remains to her. And though, as with Joe, Pip feels 
towards Biddy a degree of guilt (“it occurred to me that perhaps I had not been 
sufficiently grateful to Biddy” [127]), still his reaction is to talk to Biddy about his 
feelings, not hers. Consequently, as Pip’s emotional maturity remains the dominating 
concern of the passage, Biddy is flattened, present finally only to reflect on Pip, her voice 
permitted presence only so far as it contributes to Pip’s own self-narrative. Thus, Biddy 
suffers twice over, silenced once by the young Pip as he ignores her voice, silenced a 
second time by the author Pip, as he, in essence, gives Biddy voice only to the extent that 
it amplifies Pip’s own. 
Perhaps the most striking instance of the novel’s subversion of dialogism involves 
Pip’s relationship with the villain Orlick, for here the gulf between self and other reaches 
it maximum. There exists only “bad faith” dialogue between Pip and Orlick, as their 
relationship is characterized by an absolutely unbridgeable distrust. However, inasmuch 
as Pip’s relationship with Orlick illuminates the narrative’s assault on dialogism, so too 
Orlick provides an interesting challenge to the idea of Pip’s absolute monological 
authority in the text. With Orlick, Pip’s agonistic relationship proves much less nuanced 
than with Mrs. Joe, Joe, or Biddy. Pip has long resented Orlick, both because he “always 
slouched” (112), and because Orlick eyes Biddy, whom Pip, though treating her 
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dismissively, nonetheless feels possessive towards. While Orlick, brutal, cruel, base, and 
murderous, certainly proves an unsavory figure, nonetheless, all that readers know about 
Orlick is what Pip represents, and what he represents is a man constantly negated and 
undermined by Pip himself. Indeed, Pip “[keeps] an eye on Orlick” (132), preventing him 
from pursuing Biddy, though not so much for Biddy’s benefit as for Pip’s own, as Pip 
treats Orlick’s advances “as if . . . [they] were an outrage on myself” (132). Moreover, 
Pip goes out of his way to get Orlick fired from Miss Havisham’s, and would have liked 
to have gotten him fired from Joe’s forge, except Orlick had “struck root in Joe’s 
establishment” (132). But Orlick senses his subordinated position to Pip. When readers 
first encounter Orlick, who is only a few years Pip’s elder, Orlick expresses his 
frustration. He says to Joe, who is about to give Pip a half-day off, “’Now, master! Sure 
you’re not a going to favour only one of us. If young Pip has a half-holiday, do as much 
for Old Orlick’” (113). In short, again and again Pip subverts Orlick, bounding him, 
negating his voice. But Orlick, unlike other characters discussed, appears aware of Pip’s 
activities, watching him, waiting for an opportunity to reverse the situation. 
So, although Pip repeatedly silences Orlick, denying him “existence and validity,” 
the text seemingly gives Orlick a voice, for Orlick’s resistance to Pip provides a textual 
site where Pip’s voice appears challenged. Indeed, the question of Orlick proves most 
complicated in that Orlick’s continued opposition to Pip in Pip’s narrative reveals 
tensions latent in Pip’s attempt to will the world into the shape he desires. This becomes 
most pronounced when Orlick captures Pip, permitting Orlick, in a sense, to hijack Pip’s 
narrative and to challenge Pip’s own powers of representation. As noted, all the reader 
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has known to this point is what Pip has drawn of Orlick. Here one gets Orlick’s 
refutation, as Orlick “subjects [Pip] to a ‘trial’ in which the ancient crimes of Pip against 
Orlick are recited” (Westburg 139): “You cost me . . . [Miss Havisham’s] place. You did. 
Speak!” (424). Significantly, however, even during Orlick’s moment of ascendancy, 
Pip’s voice is invoked, as Orlick demands Pip speak, something Pip never requested of 
Orlick. Orlick continues, “How dared you come betwixt me and a young woman I liked?” 
(424). And when Pip proceeds to justify himself, Orlick dismisses Pip’s claims: “You’re 
a liar” (424).  
Pip’s narrative perspective is incompatible with Orlick’s; and though perhaps at 
some level, Pip realizes he “is indeed not a person with totally clean hands” (Westburg 
139), nevertheless, Orlick must be punished for the potential destabilizing effect of his 
perspective. Despite Orlick’s claims, there can be only one authoritative narrative in the 
end. Consequently, speaking of Orlick’s “bad name” to undercut Orlick’s accusations 
against Pip, Pip declares, “You gave it to yourself; you gained it for yourself. I could 
have done you no harm, if you had done yourself none” (424). Pip thus reasserts his own 
position, monologically negating Orlick as an isolated product of Orlick’s own criminal 
tendencies. While Orlick’s resistance to Pip’s authority is undeniable, Pip manages to 
translate his struggle against Orlick into the recognizable scenario of hero versus villain, 
thereby defusing Orlick’s narrative threat, as Pip is able to dismiss Orlick’s claims 
against him as merely those of a soured rival. Ultimately, as Pip subverts Mrs. Joe’s, 
Joe’s, and Biddy’s voice, so he also subverts Orlick’s. Whereas for dialogism, it is only 
“in recognizing an Other as a self (and the self as an Other) [that] dialogue is born” 
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(Gurevitch 182), for Pip, dialogue suggests the threatening possibility of his own de-
centering, which he parries via his negating of these others.  
The problem posed by Orlick’s threat to Pip’s authority, however, raises a larger 
question concerning Pip’s power over the text. How absolute is it? What are its 
limitations, and how does this reflect on Bakhtin’s theorizations? If Pip has the power to 
represent others according to his own vision, if he can in some sense effect control over 
others via disingenuous responses to them, what does it mean then that Great 
Expectations seems to sabotage, in the end, Pip’s own monological claims to narrative 
authority, suggesting instead that Pip possesses little control over his text in many 
substantive ways? For instance, Pip’s benefaction is not as he desired, he does not marry 
Biddy, Estella also rejects him, and, for eleven years, he is banished from his own 
narrative to Cairo. In fact, the last third of the book demonstrates how deluded the young 
Pip’s expectations for himself were in the first two-thirds. If Pip ultimately finds himself 
so circumscribed by the “factual” events of Great Expectations, does the text itself 
somehow escape Pip or expose Pip’s monological assertion of singular authority and 
centrality as a fraud or as an elaborate defense mechanism? In a sense, yes, as the young 
Pip’s desires are seemingly all undercut by the brute facts of reality confronting him; for 
as John Kucich observes, “Pip’s central discovery is that his project of gaining autonomy 
has only forged him new chains” (155-56). Indeed, the novel’s melancholy ending 
reinforces this idea, as it implicitly critiques Pip’s book-long efforts at maintaining 
narrative authority, intimating that Pip cannot will the world into the shape he desires. He 
can only react to it.  
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Furthermore, one might argue that monological discourse, discourse in which an 
individual claims for her or himself an authoritative position, emerges only in response to 
the anxiety of knowing that one’s stance is always precarious, always open. As Pip 
himself repeatedly illustrates, monological selves are driven to invent the ground they 
stand upon, to invent their origins, all the while fearful that an other will undermine their 
constructions for that other’s own.13 Again and again we’ve seen Pip grappling with 
others for authority, seemingly out of an anxiety regarding the origins of his own voice: 
he scripts his family from their own mute tombstones; he caricatures Mrs. Joe and Joe 
and minimizes Biddy and Orlick. In fact, it is possible to read his inaugural experience 
with Magwitch as the initiating movement in what could be perceived as Pip’s book-long 
anxiety over control of the text. Pip’s abetting Magwitch marks Pip with a “secret 
burden,” a “guilty knowledge,” fills him with the dread of “great punishment,” planting 
in him an anxiety that he is playing a role in someone else’s text, that he may not possess 
the authoritative voice he desires to (13). And, of course, reinforcing this anxiety, others’ 
voices truly seem to break through in some places in the text. If this is so, perhaps the text 
intimates the validity of a dialogism of one kind or another, just not necessarily 
Bakhtinian dialogism. 
Nevertheless, inasmuch as the novel appears to circumscribe Pip’s authority, it 
also re-inscribes it by abetting Pip in the negation of others’ voices: Mrs. Joe is brutally 
assaulted and consequently disabled; Pumblechook is robbed and beaten; Drummle beats 
Estella; and Miss Havisham, forced to her knees before Pip, shortly thereafter 
                                                 
13 Dennett notes, “of all the things in the environment an active body must make mental models of, none is 
more crucial than the model the agent has of itself” (427).  
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“spontaneously combusts,” as Houston puts it (22). Indeed, Miss Havisham provides a 
unique instance where the text hints at dialogical possibilities only to undercut them. Late 
in the novel, when Pip goes to Miss Havisham for the last time, she finally and fully 
acknowledges what she has done to both Pip and Estella. As Pip is talking to her, she 
“dropped on her knees at my feet; with her folded hands raised to me in the manner in 
which, when her poor heart was young and fresh and whole, they must often have been 
raised to heaven from her mother’s side” (398). She seems at last to see Pip as a person 
and not as an object upon which to write her revenge. Her awakening, which had begun 
when Estella had confessed to Pip she would wed Drummle, is here completed. But 
immediately after this awakening, the text appears to punish her: “I saw [Miss Havisham] 
running at me, shrieking, with a whirl of fire blazing all about her, and soaring at least as 
many feet above her head as she was high” (402). Though Miss Havisham survives, Pip 
never sees her again; thus the text subverts the dialogical encounter just as it offers a 
glimpse of it. In short, mirroring Pip’s own efforts, the text seems to silence many of 
those who threaten Pip’s voice. At the least, the text equivocally supports Pip, proffering 
a reality against which he sets himself and into which he interjects his narrative in an 
effort to master that reality, a clearly monological task. But at best, the text itself 
construes reality in a way that creates the impression that it supports Pip’s monological 
struggle for authority over his tale as he exercises his power to represent others.  
Thus any gap between Pip’s voice and the novel itself blurs, for though at times it 
may seem to undercut Pip’s claims, exposing the limitations of Pip’s authority and the 
extent of his anxieties, Great Expectations ultimately cannot be said to subvert Pip’s 
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monological stance, as the text centers on the power and authority of Pip’s own singular 
voice. After all, as discussed earlier, Great Expectations is Pip’s story of himself, infused 
with and animated by his voice. And “[v]oice,” as Singer states, is “the dominant 
metaphor for the totalizing power of novelistic form, . . . the genre’s locus of 
subjectivity” (173). But Singer’s observation would seem to contradict Bakhtin, 
suggesting that “novelistic form” is always already monological, as the novel, or at least 
the realist novel, is typically organized around a single voice and perspective.14 
Especially for a homodiegetic bildungsroman like Great Expectations, this suggests the 
impossibility of escaping monologism for any polyphonic dialogism, as indeed, Pip’s 
voice imposes its perspective incessantly on the text. In a sense, Pip illustrates Catherine 
Belsey’s “hierarchy of voices,” wherein one dominant voice imposes itself on others, 
drowning them out in an effort to secure “the ‘truth’ of the story” (64). For Pip, there 
exists no “ratio of perspectives” wherein voices perceive and negotiate with each other as 
characterizes dialogism (Singer 174). Rather, Pip, as narrator, radically privileges his 
own perspective, subordinating other voices to his own, denying them dialogic 
recognition.  
In asserting his own absolute textual authority, in fact, using that authority at 
times to satirize himself, the narrating Pip intimates that he is ultimately untouchable and 
beyond the influence of others, as his voice becomes the sole locus of meaning. Amy 
Sadrin imagines the situation in this way:  
                                                 
14 Even a text as apparently decentered as Wilkie Collins’ The Woman in White nevertheless betrays a 
surprising monologism. Although the text offers a series of seemingly independent narrative voices, in the 
end, they all service Hartright’s text, thereby reducing their dialogical potentiality, as the voice of Hartright 
proves omnipresent even in the internally framed narratives from which it is ostensibly absent.  
 64
 
Having now reached maturer years [sic] and given up impossible dreams, 
[Pip] can afford to recollect emotions in tranquility, look at his younger 
self [and others] with amused and sympathetic superiority and take 
pleasure in misleading all the other fools who are ready to follow in his 
steps. (118)  
 
 
As dialogism requires “an impassioned play of voices” (Nealon 131), and as Pip scripts 
himself above such play, Pip ultimately suggests he is finalized—a profoundly non-
dialogic position, for dialogism emphasizes the “unfinalizability” of voice and 
selfhood.15 Moreover, as voice serves as the novel’s “locus of subjectivity,” and since 
Pip’s voice appears the organizing presence behind the words, so the implication seems 
to be that behind the narrative looms a static, singular consciousness, a puppeteer of sor
Is this aspect of Pip’s tale merely a function of the formalistic pressures of first-p
narration, a monological illusion generated by the impossibility of telling a story without 
revealing (or rather constructing) a perspective or voice?
ts. 
erson 
                                                
16 Or, is the puppeteer notion of 
Pip the accurate reflection of Pip’s conscious insistence on his own active self-creation 
and thus more or less localized to his particular narrative? The irresolvable tension 
between these two questions reveals serious fissures in Bakhtin’s formulations. For, via 
Pip’s ubiquitously present voice, Great Expectations challenges the “multi-languaged 
consciousness” Bakhtin maintains is “realized in the novel” (“Epic” 11), and posits 
instead some Blakean Nobodaddy who “hide[s] [him]self in clouds / From every 
 
15 Gary Saul Morson and Caryl Emerson affirm that “Bakhtin envisaged all of life as an ongoing, 
unfinalizable dialogue, which takes place at every moment of daily existence” (59).  
16 Dennett reminds us that “streams of narrative issue forth as if from a single source . . . their effect on any 
audience is to encourage them to (try to) posit a unified agent whose words they are, about whom they are: 
in short, to posit a center of narrative gravity” (418).  
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searching Eye” (Blake lines 3-4), crafting narratives, inventing selves, but with no 
answerability to the other required.   
Paradoxically, despite the text’s implicit suggestion that the narrating Pip is 
beyond others’ influence, Great Expectations as a whole does illustrate, as Bakhtin writes 
of Dostoevsky, that “[w]hat . . . characters say constitutes an arena of never-ending 
struggle with others’ words, in all realms of life and creative ideology” (“Discourse” 
349). And, in concurrence with Bakhtin’s notions of the self’s construction, the young 
Pip’s “ideological development is . . . an intense struggle within . . . for hegemony among 
various available verbal and ideological points of view, approaches, directions and 
values” (“Discourse” 346). It becomes evident, as Pip feels the need to contain, control, 
negate, or silence the voices of those around him, that voices exert some pressure upon 
Pip, and Pip a pressure upon other voices. He is influenced by the discourses of others as 
he endeavors to affirm an identity via his self-narrative. Indeed, Great Expectations 
reiterates over and over the influences individuals have on other individuals, on 
contributing to the ongoing development of others’ consciousnesses, on orienting and 
molding their lives: Jaggers molds Molly, Miss Havisham Estella, Pip Herbert Pocket, 
and Magwitch, ostensibly, Pip.  
Nevertheless, though tacitly acknowledging the effects characters have on other 
characters, the novel disputes Bakhtin’s corollary claim that “The ideological becoming 
of a human being . . . is the process of selectively assimilating the words of others” 
(“Discourse” 341), for characters repeatedly reveal their inability to resist others’ 
“ideological point of view” by “selectively assimilating” only part of it. In each 
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aforementioned relationship, one party exerts an inordinate amount of power over the 
other. One party scripts the other, appropriating the other’s voice into the voice of her or 
his own particular story, thereby mirroring Pip’s own textual behavior. Z. D. Gurevitch 
writes, “the principle underlying the framework of dialogue is the production of a 
‘dialogic’ connection between two (or more) individual selves based on the idea of 
recognition. . . . one is obliged to turn to the other as an Other, and call the other into 
presence within the dialogic connection” (181). In the end, neither Pip nor the other 
characters turn “to the other as an Other, and call the other into presence within the 
dialogic connection.” Rather, they turn to the other to monologically script her or him 
into their own stories, stories then re-enfolded into Pip’s narrative of himself.  
Thus, Dickens’ novel offers a conceptualization of the self based more on 
individuals’ “distortions of the other” by means of their contaminating influence 
(Justman 79), than an open dialogism where individuals actively recognize the voices 
they negotiate with and consciously “selectively assimilate” discourse. Contra Bakhtin 
then, Great Expectations suggests that selfhood is not constructed in the properly 
dialogical sense, where the “dialogic connection, means [first] to acknowledge and [then 
to] contact oneself with the vital presence of an other self” (Gurevitch 183), where 
questions of power are more or less repressed. Rather, Pip’s narrative posits a model of 
the self much less dialogical than monological, suggesting that selves attempt to author 
themselves through attempts to appropriate the voice of an other for oneself. In Great 
Expectations, characters simply do not negotiate in the manner Bakhtin would assume for 
them.  
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For example, Pip, as he does with so many other characters, subordinates Herbert 
Pocket’s voice to his own. But he does not do this via negating caricature, as with Mrs. 
Joe or Joe, nor does he do it via evasion or suppression, as with Biddy. Rather, Pip 
contains Herbert by bringing Herbert under his subversive influence, eclipsing him 
merely by befriending him. Pip’s sway over Herbert becomes particularly apparent once 
Pip’s dissipation begins. As Pip’s resources become strained due to his “lavish habits” 
(272), Herbert’s fortunes mirror Pip’s, for Herbert cannot resist Pip’s influence over him 
and thus he sinks into debt. Significantly, Pip admits,  
 
concerning the influence of my position on others . . . I perceived—though 
dimly enough perhaps—that it was not beneficial to anybody, and, above 
all, that it was not beneficial to Herbert. My lavish habits led his easy 
nature into expenses that he could not afford, corrupted the simplicity of 
his life, and disturbed his peace with anxieties and regrets. (272)  
 
 
Pip realizes his power over Herbert, no matter how “dimly”; and though by 
acknowledging this, Pip in some way acknowledges Herbert as an other, nonetheless, it 
proves a hollow acknowledgement, for Pip’s pervasive influence over Herbert does not 
cease. Indeed, when Pip anonymously arranges an income for Herbert, he merely 
exchanges one method of influence for another; his compulsion to regulate Herbert’s 
voice, however, remains the same. When Pip’s influence over Herbert does recede, 
namely, when Herbert marries, takes the position in Cairo, and is later joined by Pip 
himself, Pip elides the narrative, spending just a few short pages to cover his eleven years 
in Egypt; for Pip cannot represent a narrative in which he is clearly not ascendant. 
However, as Pip was responsible for Herbert’s rising in the world, so Pip still implicitly 
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lays claim to Herbert’s own story as an extension of his own. Herbert in Cairo is still a 
Herbert who has been over-determined by Pip. In his “Toward a Reworking of the 
Dostoevsky Book,” Bakhtin writes, “To be means to be for another, and through the other 
for oneself. A person has no sovereign internal territory . . . he looks into the eyes of 
another or with the eyes of another” (287). But Great Expectations ultimately inverts this 
model of dialogical influence, suggesting that individuals do not exist for another, and 
“through the other” for themselves, but rather exist only for themselves, appropriating 
others according to their desires, as Pip appropriates Herbert. In this manner, the novel 
further exposes limitations to Bakhtinian dialogism, as it posits a more agonistic model of 
interpersonal relations, a model of power dynamics, wherein monological selves directly 
and indirectly seek to subordinate others, as they presume to self-narrate themselves into 
being.  
It is not only Pip’s own relationship with others in the text which reveals, if you 
will, this non-dialogic dialogism, or negative dialogics; as noted above, the relationships 
between other characters reiterate this agonistic pattern independently of Pip. In 
particular, as Pip obscures Herbert’s voice by distorting it, masking it with his own, so 
Miss Havisham likewise obscures Estella. Miss Havisham, who never perceives Estella 
as an authentic other entitled to her autonomy, molds her to her will, using the influence 
of her position as Estella’s guardian to deliberately warp her. As Estella matures, she 
realizes what has been done, though cannot escape what Miss Havisham has made her. 
This is illustrated in the only argument Pip represents occurring between the two. Most 
significantly, here Great Expectations reveals its conceptualization of the self’s 
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construction most clearly. Estella says to a shocked Miss Havisham, “I am what you have 
made me” (304), and expanding on that statement, she adds moments later, “I must be 
taken as I have been made” (306). Estella, in contrast to Pip, does not create herself, but 
rather is Havisham’s product, a thing of revenge “to be bartered in the marriage market” 
(Houston 15). For Bakhtin, “we must, we all must, create ourselves, for the self is not 
given (dan) to any one of us” (Holquist, Dialogism 29): selves self-author themselves as 
they dialogically interact with an other. Great Expectations, implicitly acknowledging 
dialogism’s anti-essentialist notion that “the self is not given to any one of us,” 
nonetheless complicates this assertion, for selves, while attempting to narrate themselves 
into existence (as Pip does), are also passive products of another’s monological 
construction or narration. Estella is who she is because Miss Havisham willed it. Estella, 
thus over-determined by Havisham’s negative influence, learns likewise to influence and 
manipulate those around her, and consequently to monologically “den[y] the existence 
and validity of the Other.” A vicious tautology emerges in Great Expectations, in which 
individuals manipulate others only to be manipulated themselves. The notion of selfhood 
itself becomes exclusively combative and dialectical, as individuals structure themselves 
against others, not with them.  
Although Estella and Miss Havisham’s relationship implicitly reiterates Pip’s 
relationships with other characters, ironically, one cannot overlook Estella and Miss 
Havisham’s apparent effect on Pip himself. For, despite Pip’s considerable textual power, 
Pip does not conceal their influence over him, or at least his belief in it, as Pip represents 
their voices, disrupting and unhealthy, slowly saturating his consciousness. Reflecting on 
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the old House, for Pip a synecdochic extension of Miss Havisham and Estella, Pip asks, 
“What could I become with these surroundings? How could my character fail to be 
influenced by them? Is it to be wondered at if my thoughts were dazed” (96). Indeed, 
Estella’s initial judgment of Pip as a “coarse common boy” (93) is an assault on Pip’s 
original self-conceptualization, his self-naming. In other words, Estella negates Pip, and 
does so along class lines, scripting Pip as inferior, just as Pip scripts so many others. As 
such, Pip feels an injustice has been committed, and Estella becomes truly an 
intimidating other he must struggle against, as he reacts to his fear of her voice usurping 
his own centrality. 
Thus, Pip becomes consumed with Estella. This is not Bakhtinian dialogism, but a 
mode of interpersonal influence outside the Bakhtinian model; indeed, it threatens the 
underlying assumptions of the Bakhtinian model. Pip represents Estella as over-
determining his consciousness and thereby inhibiting him from “awaken[ing] to [any] 
independent ideological life,” that fundamental tenant of Bakhtin’s conceptualization of 
the self’s dialogical construction (Bakhtin, “Discourse” 345). Dialogism requires an 
interplay of voices, mutual introjections of one voice into another, and thus one 
consciousness into another, with the result of an individual’s awakening to her or his own 
autonomous consciousness. But Pip represents this process as abortive, for some voices 
possess the power to coerce the consciousnesses of others, overshadowing them to the 
extent that they become only echoes of another’s stronger voice. As Aaron Fogel notes in 
his critique of dialogism, the “necessary disproportion between speakers” foils dialogism 
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(181). Pip represents his own narrative, then, as the result of Estella’s appropriation of his 
voice. In a very telling passage Pip writes of Estella:  
 
You are part of my existence, part of myself. You have been in every line 
I have ever read, since I first came here, the rough common boy whose 
poor heart you wounded even then. . . . You have been in every prospect I 
have ever seen. . . . You have been the embodiment of every graceful 
fancy that my mind has ever become acquainted with. The stones of which 
the strongest London buildings are made, are not more real . . . than your 
presence and influence have been to me. (364) 
 
  
As Miss Havisham has monologically distorted Estella’s consciousness, so Pip claims 
Estella has distorted his, for she becomes “part” of his very “existence.” But, as Maurice 
Friedman quotes Martin Buber affirming, “Wherever one lets the other exist only as part 
of oneself, ‘dialogue becomes a fiction, the mysterious intercourse between two human 
worlds only a game’” (354-55). 
Yet this brings us back to the singular power Pip wields as the teller of his own 
tale. By asserting that Estella so absolutely contaminates his consciousness, Pip 
paradoxically suggests that Estella “has no ‘self’; she has only a role” in his own 
narrative (Waters 159). As Waters notes, “in assigning her the agency for his 
predicament, Pip . . . uses Estella to ground his own identity, to signify his own moral 
development” (Waters 160). In other words, though overtly asserting she scripts him, all 
the while Pip is passively scripting her for use in his own narrative of self. Since Estella 
“can only be represented by Pip,” her voice serves only as a surrogate for his own 
(Waters 160). Thus, Pip reduces Estella to not much more than the catalyzing agent of his 
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own stated and unstated desires.17 Pip does not see Estella, but only his own desire for 
what she suggests he lacks. Like Mrs. Joe and others, Estella becomes an image he reacts 
to which he himself has constructed. Consequently, Pip responds to Estella not as an 
authentic other, but as an indicator of his own social difference and “inferiority,” which 
he must overcome to maintain the sense of narrative authority he has established from the 
very beginning of his story.  
So, whereas Pip directly negates other characters in the narrative, actively 
subordinating their voices to his, Pip indirectly negates Estella. As Houston notes, 
ultimately, “neither Pip nor the reader has any conception of what Estella’s desires or 
hungers might be, only that she has been ‘bent and broken’ into ‘better shape’ in order to 
fulfill Pip’s desires” (23). Thus, Pip’s relations with Estella challenge Bakhtinian 
dialogism twice over. Firstly, Pip represents Estella as over-determining his own 
consciousness as she unceasingly shadows his every thought. But more remarkably, Pip’s 
representation of Estella’s power over him proves finally an exercise in his own power 
over her. Great Expectations, in the end, is Pip’s narrative of himself as he envisions 
himself, and all representations are literally bent towards that end.  
Speaking of Bakhtin and Derrida, Daphna Erdinast-Vulcan reminds one that 
“both [thinkers] know that the I that tells itself does not exist,” and each asks the 
question, “How can one become what one is?” (266). For Pip in Great Expectations, 
textual self-authoring is quite literally the existential act of self-authoring. Pip wants to 
tell the tale of his own becoming, construct his own bildungsroman according to his 
                                                 
17 Indeed, Bert Hornback observes, “when [Pip] meets Miss Havisham, he is immediately seduced by the 
idea of wealth”; Estella merely “completes the seduction” (30, 31). 
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vision of his youth; thus Pip becomes the “I” who tells himself he exists. But, as we have 
seen, Pip scripts himself by subverting the narrative voices of others, by 
(mis)representing them, rhetorically establishing his own voice as the central, 
authoritative voice in his narrative. Pip seeks to assert to others, however consciously or 
unconsciously, “You are what I have made you”: Mrs. Joe is a shrew, Joe is a simpleton, 
Biddy, as her name suggests, is a bothersome hen, Orlick is a brute, etc. Each person in 
the text exists largely as extensions of Pip, voices in his tale of becoming meant to 
illustrate his development at the expense of their own. Indeed, when Pip is not 
misconstruing others, his “bad faith” nevertheless subverts the potential for dialogical 
encounters, further contributing to the false dialogism which troubles Bakhtin’s 
monological/dialogical dichotomy. In minimizing the voices of others, Pip illustrates his 
closure, his inability to hear any voice but his own. Holquist points out that “[t]he 
obsessive question at the heart of Bakhtin’s thought is always ‘Who is talking?’” 
(“Answering” 307). In Great Expectations, Pip is always talking or mediating the talk of 
others. Thus, in a sense, Great Expectations is Pip’s echo chamber. His voice 
reverberates unceasingly throughout the text, and every other voice becomes a rebounded 
version of his own. Ironically, inasmuch as Pip inflects the others in his narrative through 
his own voice, confining them to his own perspective, so Pip confines himself, limiting 
his voice to its own reflexive action.  
Recall from earlier Holquist’s assertion that “It is a cardinal assumption of 
dialogism that every human subject is not only highly conscious, but that his or her 
cognitive space is coordinated by the same I/other distinctions that organize my own” 
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(Dialogism 33). If such is dialogism’s “cardinal assumption,” then Great Expectations 
greatly troubles any purely dialogic conceptualization of the interpersonal construction of 
selfhood. The novel suggests, via Pip’s monological narrative, that individuals are largely 
conscious only of themselves, and that they do not process their interactions with others 
in terms compatible with any mutually understood “I/other” distinction. Rather, 
individuals monologically contest with each other in a struggle not only to make space 
for their own voices, but to seize the voice of the other for their own. Thus, while 
undermining Bakhtin’s dialogical conceptualization of selfhood, Pip’s narrative suggests 
its own model of dialogics based on the power dynamics at play between monological 
selves. For these selves portray a world of human interactions where there is little 
negotiation between voices, only perpetual friction between individuals vying to 
rhetorically establish their own vision of the world and their place in it.  
Paradoxically, however, in portraying a world in which selves appear closed to 
the alterity of other selves, in which polyphony is suppressed, and in which individuals 
ostensibly write themselves into being, Pip’s story betrays the anxieties of 
consciousnesses that sense that they are neither the identities they invent for themselves, 
nor the narratives in which they place themselves. As hard as they work to impose 
narrative order on a world irreducibly open and unknown, so someone else works to 
counter it. Pip’s monological performance, then, reveals not only limitations to Bakhtin’s 
theorizations, but carries within itself hints of its own. Indeed, the performance suggests, 
despite Pip’s declarations to the contrary, that the “I that tells itself [truly] does not exist.”  
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